

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 09/11/2001

[redacted] Connecticut (CT), telephone [redacted] was interviewed at his residence and voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] received a telephone call at his residence from [redacted] PETER BURTON HANSON, Date of Birth: 01/24/1969, Place of Birth: Bridgeport, CT. sometime before 9:00 A.M. this morning. [redacted] indicated that the plane on which he was presently a passenger was being hijacked. [redacted] asked whether [redacted] was joking but he knew from the serious tone in his voice that he wasn't. PETER HANSON repeated that his plane was being hijacked indicating "I think they've taken over the cockpit...an attendant has been stabbed...and someone else up front may have been killed. The plane is making strange moves. Call United Airlines, ..Tell them it's Flight 175, Boston to LA."

[redacted] noted that his son was talking in a low tone, but not whispering. He believed [redacted] was calling from his cellular telephone, which number he provided as [redacted]

[redacted] immediately phoned the Easton Police Department and spoke with Captain James Candee. He told Captain Candee about the substance of the call and asked for any assistance Candee could provide.

Within a matter of minutes, [redacted] received a second telephone call from [redacted]. He recalled his son saying the following: "It's getting bad, [redacted] A stewardess was stabbed...they seem to have knives and mace...They said they have a bomb...It's getting very bad on the plane...passengers are throwing up and getting sick...the plane is making jerky movements...I don't think the pilot is flying the plane...I think we're going down...I think they intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a building."

[redacted] said he heard noise of a woman screaming in the background.

PETER HANSON continued, "Don't worry, [redacted] if it happens it'll be very fast."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-25-2007 BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CPB/YMW

Investigation on 09/11/2001 at Easton, Connecticut

File # 265D-NY-280350

Date dictated 09/11/2001

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

REQ. #35-13
DR# 8/9
302 9269
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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/11/2001, Page 2

[REDACTED] said the call ended with [REDACTED] saying "My God, my God..."

[REDACTED] could not say why the call ended abruptly. He did not know whether [REDACTED] had hung up or whether the phone malfunctioned. He said he resisted the temptation to call [REDACTED] right back because he did not want to place him in any more serious danger by having his cell phone ring on the plane.

PETER HANSON gave no additional information as to the identity, nationality, physical description, accents, etc. of the hijacker(s).

[REDACTED] took two sheets of notes during the two phone calls and he provided these notes to interviewing agents.

[REDACTED] indicated he could recall no additional information or background noise from the telephone calls other than the aforementioned sound of an unidentified woman screaming.

[REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as follows:

Name:	PETER BURTON HANSON
Sex:	Male
Race:	Caucasian
DOB:	01/24/1969
POB:	Bridgeport, Connecticut
Residence:	46 Painted Post Road Groton, Massachusetts
Home Telephone:	(978)448-8874
Height:	Five feet, ten inches
Weight:	170-175 lbs.
Hair:	Balding red frizzy
Complexion:	Fair with freckles
Miscellaneous:	Regularly wore a Breitling wristwatch and antique wedding ring

PETER BURTON HANSON is employed as Vice-President of Marketing with TimeTrade.com of Newton, Massachusetts. He graduated from Northeastern University in Boston with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Business Administration and attained a Master's Degree in Business Administration (MBA) from Boston University.

HANSON was traveling to Los Angeles, California, to attend a business meeting and was accompanied on United Flight 175 by his wife, SUE KIM HANSON, born 07/23 (believed to be 38 years old), female, first

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 09/11/2001 , Page 3

generation Korean, 5'3" height, 135 pounds, and their daughter and only child, CHRISTINE HANSON, born 02/23/1999. This was their first plane trip as a family and SUE HANSON was taking their daughter CHRISTINE to visit SUE's grandmother for the first time. Both of SUE HANSON's parents are deceased. SUE HANSON is a doctoral candidate in the medical field at Boston University.

[REDACTED] had traveled to Boston on Thursday, 09/06/2001, to visit with [REDACTED]. They were excited about their upcoming flight and indicated they intended to obtain seating in the bulkhead area behind the first-class seating so they could have more room for CHRISTINE to play. He is not certain where they were seated on the flight.

SUE KIM HANSON wears corrective eyeglasses and an antique wedding ring, like her husband PETER. Her and PETER's ring were the wedding band's of [REDACTED] and had been handed down as gifts. The bands may have inscriptions and may have been cut to size from the original. Furthermore, PETER's ring may have been repaired.

[REDACTED] provided interviewing agents with a color photo portrait of [REDACTED] family. A digital color photograph was taken of the portrait by SA [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] indicated that after receiving the calls from [REDACTED] he turned on the television to see whether the hijacking was being reported. He noted he began watching just in time to see the live footage of the second airliner crashing into the World Trade Center.

[REDACTED] received a telephone call this morning from an individual identifying himself as Special Agent [REDACTED] of the Chicago FBI Office with telephone number [REDACTED]. SA [REDACTED] indicated he was calling [REDACTED] because he received his name from United Airlines.

Present during portions of the interview was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (DOB: [REDACTED])

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9/28/01

[redacted] Massachusetts (MA), [redacted] was interviewed at her residence. Also present and participating in the interview was her [redacted] was advised of the purpose of the interview and the identities of the interviewing agents. Thereafter, [redacted] provided the following information:

On September 11, 2001, the morning of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC), [redacted] BRIAN DAVID SWEENEY, date of birth 8/10/63, home address [redacted] MA, called her from a phone aboard his plane, possibly from his cell phone, cell telephone number [redacted] to tell her that his plane had been hijacked. BRIAN SWEENEY may have been on United Airlines Flight 175. At the time of [redacted] noticed that the clock on her kitchen stove read 8:58 a.m. Her conversation with [redacted] was mostly personal. However, with regard to the hijackers, BRIAN SWEENEY told [redacted] that, "I don't know who they are." [redacted] also told [redacted] that the plane's passengers were thinking of storming the cockpit and he believed that the plane was flying somewhere over Ohio. [redacted] ended his conversation by telling her, "they are coming back." He said goodbye and the call ended. Immediately after their call ended, [redacted] turned on her television and saw the second plane hit the WTC in New York City, New York.

BRIAN SWEENEY was a former F-14 pilot for the United States military. SWEENEY worked for BRANDESS CORPORATION, a Defense contractor located in California. [redacted] (phonetic), work telephone numbers [redacted] and [redacted], was his supervisor.

[redacted] provided the interviewers with a photograph [redacted] BRIAN SWEENEY is the individual on the left-hand side of the photograph.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-25-2007 BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CPB/YMW

9/11/01

Spencer, MA

265A-NY-280350

SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

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REQ. #35-13
DR# 10 (1 page)

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09/11/2001

On September 11, 2001, at approximately 1930 hours
Special Agent's (SA's) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
were assigned a lead to contact and interview [REDACTED] AT
[REDACTED] The purpose of this interview was to speak
with [REDACTED] reference a telephone call with his daughter [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] while she was on board American Airlines Flight 77.

[REDACTED] informed SA [REDACTED] that he was not
interested in speaking at this time, however would speak with
SA's [REDACTED] on September 12, 2001. SA [REDACTED]
will contact [REDACTED] and meet reference information related to the
phone call between [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-25-2007 BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CPB/YMW

09/11/2001

Las Vegas, Nevada

(telephonically)

265D-NY-280350

09/11/2001

SA [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]

REQ. #35-13

DR# 11/16

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/14/2001

[REDACTED]

Center at (202) 514-5000. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] furnished the following information:

Earlier this morning Barbara Olson called the office two (2) times to speak with [REDACTED] was the secretary that took both of these calls. [REDACTED] believes that both calls were collect calls.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was on the phone. [REDACTED] said that Barbara is on the line and she's in a panic. [REDACTED] was watching the television coverage of the terrorist attack at the World Trade Center (WTC). [REDACTED] took the call and [REDACTED] heard him say, "hijacked!"

[REDACTED] called the DOJ Command Center and asked for a security officer to come to his office. He thought the security officer would be able to talk to Barbara Olson if she called back. He relayed that [REDACTED] was on a hijacked plane. [REDACTED] then came out of his office and said, "they have knives and they're making them go to the back of the plane."

Barbara Olsen then called back a second time and spoke with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] went back to watch the television coverage and saw the crash at the Pentagon. [REDACTED] said, "that's Barbara's plane."

The security officer from the DOJ Command Center arrived after the second phone call.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-25-2007 BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CPB/YHW

Investigation on 9/11/01 at Washington, D.C. (telephonically)

File # 265D-NY-280350-302

Date dictated

by SSA [REDACTED] b6
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(01/26/1998)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 09/20/2001

To: PITTSBURGH

Attn:

From: PITTSBURGH

Approved By: CS

Drafted By:

Case ID #: 265A-PG-69744 (PENDING)

Title: UNITED FLIGHT 93
PFLP

Synopsis: ICF #: PG1012

Details:

INFORMATION CONTROL FORM

Control Number: PG1012

Priority: IMMEDIATE Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Method of Contact: Telephone/Radio

Source:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-25-2007 BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CPB/YMW

Affiliation:

Phone Number:

Information Received Date: 09/13/2001 Time: 10:40 AM

Prepared By:

Component/Agency: I&I/FBI

Event:

PROVIDED AN
E-MAIL RECEIVED FROM A MEMBER OF A RADIO CLUB. THE E-MAIL
RELATES INFORMATION FROM A PERSON ON UNITED 93. PASSENGERS
EVENTUALLY (?) HAD THE HIJACKERS. PASSENGER'S NAME -
JEROME GLICK. HIS WIFE TELEPHONED CALL TO 911. (FAXED
COPY OF CONTROL NUMBER HQ1409 RECEIVED FROM SIOC.) **SSA

REQ. #35-13

DR# 19

PG 580

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FAXED TO PITTSBURGH 9/16 AT 3:45 A.M.

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INSTRUCTED TO DISREGARD AS WIFE OF JEROME GLICK IS IN SAN FRANCISCO. EC DRAFTED.

Event Date: 09/13/2001 Time: 10:40 AM

References:

Categories: INFORMATION

TIME LINE INFORMATION

Event Reviewed By: CS

Lead Required?: YES

LEAD (s):

Set Lead 1:

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b7c

PITTSBURGH

AT PITTSBURGH, PA

Lead Control Number: PG1012

Assigned To [REDACTED] on 09/15/2001 at 7:55 PM

CONDUCT VICTIM FAMILY INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]

(01/26/1998)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 09/22/2001

To: PITTSBURGH

Attn:

From: PITTSBURGH

Approved By: RC

Drafted By:

Case ID #: 265A-PG-69744 (PENDING)

Title: UNITED FLIGHT 93
PFLP

Synopsis: ICF #: PG1602

Details:

INFORMATION CONTROL FORM

Control Number: PG1602

Priority: PRIORITY **Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED

Method of Contact: Telephone/Radio

Source: SOMERSET CRASH DP

Affiliation:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-25-2007 BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CPB/YMW

Phone Number:

Information Received Date: 09/20/2001 **Time:** 11:18 PM

Prepared By:

Component/Agency: I&I/FBI

Event: MARION BRITTON WAS A PASSENGER ON UA 93.

BRITTON'S ADVISED THAT
BRITTON'S

RECEIVED A CELLULAR TELEPHONE CALL FROM BRITTON DURING THE
HIJACKING. BRITTON REPORTEDLY TOLD THAT TWO PEOPLE'S
THROATS HAD BEEN SLIT AND THE PLANE WILL CRASH IN 20

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DR#19

PG 961

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SECONDS. **CONTACTED [REDACTED] HE REPLIED THAT HE b6 ;
INTERVIEWED BY FBI NEW YORK. b7c

Event Date: 09/11/2001 Time: 12:00 PM

References:

Categories: INFORMATION

TIME LINE INFORMATION

Event Reviewed By: RC

Lead Required?: YES

LEAD (s):

Set Lead 1:

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PITTSBURGH

AT PITTSBURGH, PA

Lead Control Number: PG1602

Assigned To [REDACTED] on 09/21/2001 at 1:23 AM

ASSIGN AGENT TO DETERMINE LOCATION OF [REDACTED] (LNU)
[REDACTED] AND SET LEAD TO INTERVIEW [REDACTED] LNU IF IT HAS
BEEN DETERMINED THAT HE HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN INTERVIEWED.

♦♦

(01/26/1998)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 09/22/2001

To: PITTSBURGH

Attn:

From: PITTSBURGH

Approved By: KD

Drafted By:

Case ID #: 265A-PG-69744 (PENDING)

Title: UNITED FLIGHT 93
PFLP

Synopsis: ICF #: PG1581

Details:

INFORMATION CONTROL FORM

Control Number: PG1581

Priority: IMMEDIATE Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Method of Contact: Written

Source:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-25-2007 BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CPB/YMW

Affiliation: GTE

Phone Number:

Information Received Date: 09/16/2001 Time: 12:00 AM

Prepared By:

Component/Agency: I&I/FBI

Event: ON 09/16/2001, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE ARTICLE
STATED THAT US FLIGHT 93 PASSENGER TODD BEAMER HAD A
13-MINUTE CONVERSATION WITH GTE SUPERVISOR
 (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED) DURING THE HIJACKING OF
UA FLIGHT 93. * GTE AIRFONE
SERIAL 348, CASE 265A-NY-280350, INDICATES ALL INFORMATION

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PG 947

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FROM TOLD BEAMER'S TELEPHONE CALL REFERENCE IS ALSO MADE IN
SERIAL #8.

Event Date: 09/11/2001 Time: 12:00 AM

References:

Categories: HIGHJACKING
SOMERSET CRASH

INFORMATION
TIME LINE INFORMATION

Event Reviewed By: KD

Lead Required?: YES

LEAD (s):

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Set Lead 1:

PITTSBURGH

AT PITTSBURGH, PA

Lead Control Number: PG1581

Assigned To [REDACTED] on 09/21/2001 at 1:40 AM

IF NOT ALREADY DONE, LOCATE AND INTERVIEW GTE SUPERVISOR

[REDACTED] REGARDING HER TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
TODD BEAMER, PASSENGER ON UA FLIGHT 93.

♦♦

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Page 1

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 09/30/2001

To: PITTSBURGH

From: PITTSBURGH

Approved By: JY

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: 265A-PG-69744 (PENDING)

Title: UNITED FLIGHT 93
PFLP

Synopsis: ICF #: PG2117

Details:

INFORMATION CONTROL FORM

Control Number: PG2117

Priority: IMMEDIATE Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Method of Contact: Telephone/Radio

Source: [REDACTED] LT

Affiliation: MOON TOWNSHIP PD

Phone Number: [REDACTED]

Information Received Date: 09/28/2001 Time: 10:00 PM

Prepared By: [REDACTED]

Component/Agency: I&I/FBI

Event: LT [REDACTED] WAS CONTACTED BY BRITISH REPORTER -

[REDACTED] RE TWO INDIVIDUALS
ARRESTED IN LONDON IN CONNECTION WITH THE EVENTS OF
09/11/2001. NAMES: [REDACTED] (NO
FURTHER INFO). LT [REDACTED] ADVISED HE RECEIVED TWO
COMPLAINTS FROM [REDACTED] RE LOUD NOISE ON 01/12/2001 AND
06/19/2001. [REDACTED] RESIDED AT [REDACTED] MOON
TOWNSHIP, PA. [REDACTED] DESCRIBED THIS AS A LARGE APARTMENT
COMPLEX OFF OF ROUTE 60.

FURTHER CONTACT WITH [REDACTED] REVEALED THE INDIVIDUAL HE
IDENTIFIED WAS NOT THE INDIVIDUAL ARRESTED IN LONDON. TRUE
NAME OF LONDON ARRESSTEE: [REDACTED]

Event Date: 09/28/2001 Time: 10:00 PM

Case ID : 265A-NY-280350-PG

Serial : 1342

REQ 3 Supp. #1-g

DR#19 (2 pgs)

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References:

Categories: INFORMATION

TIME LINE INFORMATION

Event Reviewed By: JY

Lead Required?: NO

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Page 1

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/11/2001

To: PITTSBURGH

From: PITTSBURGH

Approved By: JY

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: 265A-PG-69744 (PENDING)

Title: UNITED FLIGHT 93
PFLP

Synopsis: ICF #: PG2117

Details:

INFORMATION CONTROL FORM

Control Number: PG2117

Priority: ROUTINE Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Method of Contact: Telephone/Radio

Source: [REDACTED] LT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-25-2007 BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CPB/YMW

Affiliation: MOON TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT

Phone Number: [REDACTED]

Information Received Date: 09/28/2001 Time: 10:00 PM

Prepared By: [REDACTED]

Component/Agency: I&I/FBI

Event: LT. [REDACTED] WAS CONTACTED BY BRITISH REPORTER -

[REDACTED]
INDIVIDUALS ARRESTED IN LONDON IN CONNECTION WITH THE
EVENTS OF 09/11/2001. NAMES: [REDACTED]
(NO FURTHER INFO). LT. [REDACTED] ADVISED HE RECEIVED TWO
COMPLAINTS FROM [REDACTED] RE LOUD NOISE ON 01/12/2001 AND
06/19/2001/ [REDACTED] RESIDED AT [REDACTED] MOON
TOWNSHIP, PA. [REDACTED] DESCRIBED THIS AS A LARGE APARTMENT
COMPLEX OFF OF ROUTE 60. ** FURTHER CONTACT WITH [REDACTED]
REVEALED THE INDIVIDUAL HE IDENTIFIED WAS NOT THE
INDIVIDUAL ARRESTED IN LONDON. TRUE NAME OF LONDON ARRESTS.
[REDACTED]

Event Date: 09/28/2001 Time: 10:00 PM

Case ID : 265A-NY-280350-PG

Serial : 2407

REQ 3 Supp. #1-g
DR#19 (2 pgs.)

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References:

Categories: INFORMATION

TIME LINE INFORMATION

Event Reviewed By: JY

Lead Required?: NO

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/12/2001

DL-336
Case #265D-NY-280350

This is a taped telephone conversation between Flight Attendant BETTY ONG of AMERICAN AIRLINES and the AMERICAN AIRLINES SOUTHEAST RESERVATION CENTER, [REDACTED] She was on Flight 11 of AMERICAN AIRLINES. Today's date is September 11, 2001.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-25-2007 BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CPB/YMW

Investigation on 09/11/2001 at Terry, North Carolina (telephonically)

File # 265D-NY-280350

Date dictated 09/11/2001

by SA [REDACTED]

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REQ. #35-13

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DR# 21

302 3005

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Continuation of FD-302 of BETTY ONG, On 09/11/2001, Page 2

[REDACTED]

Today's date is September 11, 2001. The time is 12:28 p.m., Central Time. I'm [REDACTED] Managing Director, Corporate Security, American Airlines, Dallas Headquarters, telephone number: (817) 967-2140. I'm on the line with [REDACTED] who will relay a conversation and statement as to what transpired this morning. [REDACTED] would you please state your name and spell it, etc.

[REDACTED]

My name is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I'm calling number [REDACTED]

And [REDACTED] you are at the RALEIGH RESERVATION CENTER. Is that correct?

I'm at the SOUTHEAST RESERVATION CENTER in Terry, North Carolina.

And your telephone number is?

Area code [REDACTED]

Okay, and uh, would you relate the incident as it occurred this morning?

I'm the Operations Specialist on duty at the time and I would say at approximately 8:20, one of our employees received a phone call from, from a flight attendant on one of our flights. She answered the call through our International Resolution Desk who in turn hit the emergency button and at that time I started listening on a call. The flight attendant's name was BETTY ONG and she was relaying to us what was happening on the aircraft. Letting us know about uh two gentlemen who had gotten into the cockpit and how two of the flight attendants had been stabbed.

[REDACTED]

Okay [REDACTED] uh it is my understanding that that conversation is recorded. Is that correct?

[REDACTED]

I have it recorded and do you want it?

[REDACTED]

Yes, if you will proceed and play it.

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Continuation of FD-302 of BETTY ONG, On 09/11/2001, Page 3

[REDACTED]

I'm gonna try to play it now, I don't

FLIGHT ATTENDANT
(BETTY ONG):

(UI) This is ah ONG. We can't breathe (UI). He's got mace or something.

[REDACTED]

Can you describe the person that you said went into the flight deck or (UI)?

ONG:

I'm, I'm sitting in the back coming back from business. Can you hold on for one second, he's coming back?

Unintelligible noise in background.

ONG:

On, on number one. He stood upstairs (UI). Ah, nobody knows what he's going to do. (UI) Ah, I'm (UI) is his (UI) right now. (UI) Ah, we can't get to the cockpit, the door won't open. Hello?

[REDACTED]

Can you (UI) information relative to ah, you know, force, force that. Uhm, at this point? What operation, what flight are we talking about, Flight 12?

ONG:

Right now? Okay. We're on Flight 11 right now. Flight 11.

[REDACTED]

Flight 11, okay.

ONG:

(UI) we are working on

[REDACTED]

Yeah.

ONG:

One of the flight attendants (UI) has been stabbed.

[REDACTED]

Can anybody get up to the cockpit? Can anybody get up to the cockpit?

ONG:

We can't even get a manager to the cockpit. We don't know what's going on up there.

[REDACTED]

(UI) keep the door closed and

ONG:

Okay.

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Continuation of FD-302 of BETTY ONG, On 09/11/2001, Page 4

[REDACTED]

(UI) Did you seen the girl who got stabbed?

ONG:

I think the guys are up there. They might have gone, they are on their way up there or, or something. Nobody can call the cockpit to see if we can get inside. Hey, is anybody still there?

[REDACTED]

Yes, I'm still here.

ONG:

Okay, I'm staying on the line as well.

[REDACTED]

Okay.

[REDACTED]

(UI), who is calling reservations? Is it a flight attendant, or who? (UI)

[REDACTED]

We need for (UI) call.

ONG:

I'm number three. I'm number three on this flight. (UI) on this flight and (UI) Flight 11 (UI). Have you guys called anyone else? You know, ah somebody's calling medical and we can't get them.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE

(UM):

(UI) Is anybody there? Is anybody there?

[REDACTED]

ONG:

What, what seat are you in? What seat are you in? We've just left Boston and we're up in the air. We're suppose to go to LA and (UI).

[REDACTED]

But what seat? What's the number of your seat?

ONG:

Okay. I'm in the jump seat right now. 3R

[REDACTED]

Okay, are you the flight attendant? I'm sorry, did you say you're the flight attendant?

ONG:

Hello?

[REDACTED]

Hello, what is your name?

ONG:

Uhm, you'll have to speak up. I can't hear you.

[REDACTED]

What is your name?

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Continuation of FD-302 of BETTY ONG, On 09/11/2001, Page 5

ONG: Okay, my name is BETTY ONG. I'm number three on Flight 11.

[REDACTED]

Okay.

ONG: The cockpit is not answering their calls and there's somebody back in business class and there, we can't breathe in business class. Somebody's got mace or something.

[REDACTED]

Can you describe the person that you said, someone is flying business class?

ONG: I'm, I'm sitting in the back, he's coming back from business. If you can hold on for one second, he's coming back.

Unintelligible in background.

ONG: Our, our number one who (UI) stabbed. Or, something stabbed. Ah, nobody knows who stabbed who and we can't even get up to business class because nobody can breathe. Our number one in (UI) stabbed right now. In number five. The first class passenger that, ah first ah class galley flight attendant and our passenger is stabbed. We can't get to the cockpit, the door won't open. Hello?

[REDACTED]

Yeah, we're getting all the information. We're also, you know, of course, recording this. Uhm, at this point?

[REDACTED]

This is operations. What flight number are we talking about?

[REDACTED]

Flight 12.

[REDACTED]

Flight 12, okay.

ONG: Okay, we are Flight 11 right now. This is Flight 11.

[REDACTED]

This is Flight 11, okay.

ONG: Boston to Los Angeles.

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Continuation of FD-302 of BETTY ONG, On 09/11/2001, Page 6

[REDACTED]

Yeah.

ONG:

And the one that has been stabbed and our flight attendant has been stabbed.

[REDACTED]

Can anybody get up to the cockpit? Can anybody get up to the cockpit?

ONG:

We can't even get into the cockpit. We don't know who's up there.

[REDACTED]

(UI) keep the door closed and

ONG:

I'm sorry?

[REDACTED]

Can they not see the girls get upset?

ONG:

I think the guys are up there. They might have gone or they are on their way up there or, or something. Somebody can call the cockpit. We can't even get inside. Is anybody still there?

[REDACTED]

Yes, we're still here.

ONG:

Okay, I'll stay on the line as well.

[REDACTED]

Okay.

VANESSA:

(UI) who is calling reservations? Is it a flight attendant or who?

[REDACTED]

I believe her name is BETTY ONG.

VANESSA:

BETTY.

ONG:

I'm number three, I'm number three on this flight. (UI) on this flight.

[REDACTED]

Yeah.

ONG:

I'm Flight 11.

[REDACTED]

From where to where? Have you guys called anyone else?

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265D-NY-280350

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Continuation of FD-302 of BETTY ONG, On 09/11/2001, Page 7

ONG: No, we're just calling medical and we can't get
Recording concluded.

[REDACTED] That's as far as it goes.

[REDACTED] Okay. The conversation lasted another five or ten
minutes but that's all the recording we have?

[REDACTED] Right.

[REDACTED] Okay.

[REDACTED] Communications is checking into it to find out why
cause the emergency button was on the whole time.

[REDACTED] Okay, okay, as you recall, what was the ah, the
balance of the conversation? Can you?

[REDACTED] We were trying to determine uh, at that point I was
on the phone with [REDACTED] to determine whether there
had been an fatalities or what if they had any
description of, or if there had been any PA
announcements made from the ah, from the pilots. If
they had gotten any word from anyone like that.

[REDACTED] I see, and, and you didn't, you didn't have anymore
follow-up uh as to those questions?

[REDACTED] No, no she just repeated the same, she uh gave us the
condition of the number one flight attendant at one
point. She became conscious, they were giving her
oxygen, and ah then she told us that one of their
passengers, DANIEL LORD, I think the name was, uh,
they believed him to be fatally stabbed.

[REDACTED] Okay.

[REDACTED] He was one of our passengers in first class.

[REDACTED] Okay.

[REDACTED] And then she started telling us about how erratically
the flight was going, descending really fast and
sideways.

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Continuation of FD-302 of BETTY ONG, On 09/11/2001, Page 8

Okay, and she was at the rear of the plane on the jump seat. Is that right?

And she told us how the first class passengers had been brought back to coach.

Uh, anything else that you recall?

Uh, basically that was it.

Okay, so uh, at, at the end of that conversation did she say anything about uhm, where we're going in or did it just

No, no.

Stop.

No, at that point she was just saying, "Oh, my God, the flight, it's going down, it's going down."

Okay, those were her last comments?

Basically, "We're, we're going down." Yeah, and she did ask for us to pray for her.

Okay. Did, ah, I assume that she was on a cell phone is that right?

Uh, I, I don't know. We didn't determine that.

Okay, I, I wanted to clarify that if you had that information.

With [REDACTED] to see if they recall.

Okay. Well [REDACTED] I think that uh, that'll conclude what we need to do at this particular point if you can, if you can fax those two statements to me.

I will.

END OF TAPE.

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Continuation of FD-302 of BETTY ONG, On 09/11/2001, Page 9

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/12/2001

RE: LEAD CONTROL NUMBERS: DL267 AND CE66

The following is a re-recorded transcription obtained from AMERICAN AIRLINES (AA) by SA [REDACTED] on Tuesday, September 11, 2001. The material is being re-recorded from a CD ROM onto an Analog Audio Tape for transcription purposes.

Flight Attendant (FA) ONG

AA Agent [REDACTED]

Operations (OP) Agent [REDACTED]

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-25-2007 BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CPB/YMW

Investigation on 09/12/2001 at Raleigh, North Carolina

File # 265D-NY-280350-CE

Date dictated 09/12/2001

by SA [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]

RE: #95-19 This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. 000000457

DRA 21

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

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Continuation of FD-302 of Transcription, On 09/12/2001, Page 2

FA ONG: Number 3 in the back, ah, the cockpit is not answering, somebody stabbed in business class and ah, I think there is mace that we can't breathe, I don't know, I think we're getting hijacked.

AA Agent: Which flight are you on?

FA ONG: Flight 12

AA Agent: And what seat are you in? Ma'am are you there?

FA ONG: Yes

AA Agent: What, what, what seat are you in? Ma'am what seat are you in?

FA ONG: We're in flight, we just left Boston. We're up in the air.

AA Agent: I know, what

FA ONG: We are suppose to go to LA and the cockpit is not answering their phone.

AA Agent: Okay, but what seat are you sitting in? What's the number of your seat?

FA ONG: Okay, I'm in my jumpseat right now.

AA Agent: Okay

FA ONG: At 3R

AA Agent: Okay, you're the flight attendant? I'm sorry, did you say you're the flight attendant?

FA ONG: Hello

AA Agent: Can't

FA ONG: Hello

AA Agent: What, what is your name?

FA ONG: You'll have to speak up. I can't hear you.

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

265D-NY-280350-CE

Continuation of FD-302 of Transcription, On 09/12/2001, Page 3

AA Agent: Sure, what is your name?

FA ONG: Okay, my name is BETTY ONG, I'm number 3 on Flight 11.

AA Agent: Okay

FA ONG: And the cockpit is not answering their phone. And there is somebody stabbed in business class and there is, we can't breathe in business class, so somebody's got mace or something

AA Agent: Can you describe the person that you said, someone is in is business class.

FA ONG: Ah, ah, I'm sitting in the back, somebody is coming back from business. If you can hold on for one second.

AA Agent: Certainly.

FA ONG: (In background:) They want to know who's....I don't know but Karen and Bobbie got stabbed.

(Lots of talking with other individuals at this point)

FA ONG: Our number 1 got stabbed. A person is stabbed, nobody knows who stabbed who and we, we can't even get up to business class right now, cause nobody can breathe. Ah, our number 1 is stabbed right now.

AA Agent: Okay

FA ONG: Our number 5, our first class passengers are, our first class, our galley flight attendant and our purser has been stabbed. And we can't get into the cockpit, the door won't open. Hello?

AA Agent: Yeah, I'm taking it down, all the information, we're also ah, you know of course recording this, ah, at this point

OP Agent: This is operations, what flight number we talking about?

AA Agent: Flight 12

OP Agent: Flight 12, okay

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

265D-NY-280350-CE

Continuation of FD-302 of Transcription, On 09/12/2001, Page 4

FA ONG: We're on flight 11 right now. This is flight 11.

AA Agent: It is flight 11, I'm sorry NYDIA.

FA ONG: Boston to Los Angeles

AA Agent: Yes

FA ONG: Our number 1 has been stabbed and our 5 has been stabbed. Can anybody get up to the cockpit? Can anybody get up to the cockpit? We can't even get into the cockpit. We don't know who's up there.

AA Agent: Well if they were shrewd they would keep the door closed and..

FA ONG: I'm sorry?

AA Agent: Would they not maintain a sterile cockpit?

FA ONG: I think the guys are up there, they might have gone or jammed their way up there or something, nobody can call the cockpit, we can't even get inside. Is anybody still there?

AA Agent: Yes, we'll still here.

FA ONG: Okay, I'm staying on the line as well.

AA Agent: Okay.

OP Agent: Hi, who is calling reservations? Is this one of the flight attendants or who, who are you, hon?

AA Agent: She gave her name as BETTY ONG.

OP Agent: Betty

FA ONG: I'm number 3, I'm number 3 on this flight

OP Agent: You're the number 3 on the flight.

FA ONG: Yes

OP Agent: And this is flight 11, from where to where?

REQ. #35-13

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

265D-NY-280350-CE

Continuation of FD-302 of Transcription, On 09/12/2001, Page 5

FA ONG: Flight 11.

OP Agent: Have you guys called anyone else?

FA ONG: No. Somebody is calling Medical and we can't get

End of tape

REQ. #35-13

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/19/2001

[redacted] white female, Date of Birth (DOB) [redacted]
[redacted] MARK KENDALL BINGHAM, DOB May 22, 1970, was interviewed at Seven Springs Mountain Resort in Champion, Pennsylvania (PA). [redacted] were there to attend memorial services for victims of United Flight 93, which crashed in PA on September 11, 2001. [redacted] MARK BINGHAM, was a passenger on board that flight. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] furnished the following information:

[redacted]

On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, MARK BINGHAM called the [redacted] [redacted] was resting at the time in the bedroom, where the telephone had been turned off. [redacted] a family friend who had been there overnight helping with the children, answered the phone in the kitchen. The phone rang maybe five times before [redacted] picked it up because she thought one of the other family members would answer it. When [redacted] picked up the phone, the line was dead, so she hung up. A moment later, the phone rang again. [redacted] again answered the phone and heard a male voice (later determined to be MARK BINGHAM) say, "Get [redacted] quickly!" [redacted] asked the caller, "Is this [redacted]" The caller responded, "No. Get [redacted] quickly." No other information was provided to [redacted]

[redacted] then heard [redacted] proceed down the hallway to get [redacted] then heard [redacted] talking on the phone. She heard [redacted] say, "We love you too Mark. Let me get your mother."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-25-2007 BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CPB/YMW

Investigation on 09/17/01 at Champion, PA

File # 265D-NY-280350-302

Date dictated 09/18/01

by

SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/17/01, Page 2

[REDACTED] then alerted [REDACTED]. She said, [REDACTED] come talk to Mark. He's been hijacked," or words to that effect.

When [REDACTED] got on the phone, [REDACTED] this is MARK BINGHAM" (he stated both his first and last names) followed by, "I want to let you know I love you. I love you all." [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that she loved him too.

BINGHAM then said, "I'm on a flight from Newark to San Francisco and there are three guys who have taken over the plane, and they say they have a bomb. I'm calling you from the air phone."

[REDACTED] then asked, "Who are they Mark?" [REDACTED] was distracted and did not answer. [REDACTED] was not sure if [REDACTED] had heard the question. There was an interruption for approximately five seconds. BINGHAM then stated to [REDACTED] "You've got to believe me. It's true."

[REDACTED] responded, "I do believe you Mark. Who are they?" There was another approximate five-second pause, similar to the first, wherein [REDACTED] heard activity and voices in the background. People were murmuring. There were no screams. [REDACTED] got the impression that [REDACTED] was distracted because someone was speaking to him. Then the phone went dead.

[REDACTED] estimated that [REDACTED] was on the telephone line for a total of three minutes: roughly a minute and a half with [REDACTED] (including the time it took her to get [REDACTED] on the line), about 30 seconds with [REDACTED] and about a minute with [REDACTED]. The call originated at about 6:40 or 6:45 a.m., Pacific Daylight Time, and lasted roughly three minutes. [REDACTED] noted that while the times were estimates, her account of the conversation was nearly verbatim. Throughout the entire call, [REDACTED] sounded calm, controlled, matter-of-fact, and focused.

After getting off the phone, [REDACTED] dialed 911 to report what had occurred. She was patched through to the San Francisco Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), where she spoke with Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED]. Two FBI Agents were subsequently sent to [REDACTED] house. Shortly thereafter, [REDACTED] and her family saw televised reports that United Flight 93 had crashed.

BINGHAM was traveling on business to establish a new office on the East Coast for his California-based Public Relations firm. [REDACTED] was expecting his return to San Francisco on September 14, 2001.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/17/01, Page 3

but was not surprised to learn he was returning on the 11th instead. In this respect, [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] maintained a fluid schedule and was a frequent-flyer.

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3/27/02

On March 26, 2002, Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] accompanied by Victim Witness Specialist [redacted] proceeded to the residence of [redacted]. Upon arrival, they were greeted by [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] PA September 11th Victim Advocate, headquartered in Doylestown, Pennsylvania.

[redacted] then used headphones and a cassette player to listen to a copy of a cassette tape currently in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [redacted] was provided a transcription of this tape, which contained the audio of a 911 call made on September 11, 2001, by an individual who identified himself as [redacted] and who advised that he was a passenger aboard United Airlines Flight 93.

Pursuant to listening to the recording, [redacted] identified the voice on the tape as that of [redacted]

She then requested that [redacted] and [redacted] be provided an opportunity to hear the call. All individuals were provided as many opportunities as they wished to listen to the recording and/or to read the transcription.

When everyone who wished to hear the tape was satisfied, the visit to the residence was ended. The cassette tape containing the 911 call and its transcription remain in FBI custody.

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DATE 01-25-2007 BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CPB/YMW

3/26/02

Matawan, New Jersey

265A-NY-280350-302

SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

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3/27/02

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

May 24, 2004

Honorable Frank R. Wolf
Chairman
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary
Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

By letter to FBI Director Mueller dated March 18, 2004, you requested responses to numerous questions concerning intelligence analysis and dissemination, FBI organizational changes, and other matters.

We have worked diligently to provide accurate and thorough responses to each of your inquiries and appreciate your patience as we prepared the enclosed responses.

Please feel free to contact me if we may be of further assistance in responding to these or other inquiries.

Sincerely,

Eleni P. Kalisch
Assistant Director
Office of Congressional Affairs

Honorable José Serrano
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary
Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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DATE 01-25-2007 BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CPB/YMW

MISC. REQ. #53
DR#33(57 pgs.)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 01-30-2007 BY 60309/ AUC/TAM/MLT/CLS Derivative

FBI Responses to Questions Posed By Letter Dated March 18, 2004

GENERAL

1. What were the major lessons the FBI learned from 9/11/2001?

Response:

The terrorist threat of today presents complex challenges. Today's terrorists operate seamlessly across borders and continents, aided by sophisticated communications technologies; they finance their operations with elaborate funding schemes; and they patiently and methodically plan and prepare their attacks.

To meet and defeat this threat, the FBI must have several critical capabilities. First, we must be intelligence-driven. To defeat the terrorists, we must be able to develop intelligence about their plans and use that intelligence to disrupt those plans. We must be global. We must continue our efforts to develop our overseas operations, our partnerships with foreign services, and our knowledge and expertise about foreign cultures and our terrorist adversaries overseas. We must have networked information technology systems. We need the capacity to manage and share our information effectively. Finally, we must remain accountable under the Constitution and the rule of law. We must respect civil liberties as we seek to protect the American people.

Prior to September 11, 2001, various walls existed that prevented the FBI from sharing not only with other members of the United States Intelligence Community (USIC), but within the FBI itself. Legal walls -- real and perceived -- prevented the integration of intelligence and criminal tools in terrorism investigations. Cultural walls -- real and perceived -- continued to hamper coordination between the FBI, the CIA, and other members of the USIC. Operational walls -- real and perceived -- between the FBI and our partners in state and local law enforcement continued to be a challenge. Since the September 11th attacks, we and our partners have been breaking down each of these walls.

The legal walls between intelligence and law enforcement operations that handicapped us before 9/11 have been eliminated. The PATRIOT Act, the Attorney General's intelligence sharing procedures, and the opinion from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review tore down the legal impediments to coordination and information-sharing between criminal investigators and intelligence agents. We can now fully coordinate operations within the Bureau and with the USIC. We can also deploy the full range of

investigative tools -- both criminal processes like search warrants and grand jury subpoenas and intelligence authorities like FISA wiretap warrants -- to identify, investigate, and neutralize terrorist threats. With these changes, we in the Bureau can finally take full operational advantage of our dual role as both a law enforcement and an intelligence agency.

We are eliminating the wall that historically stood between us and the CIA. The FBI and the CIA started exchanging senior personnel in 1996, and we have worked hard to build on that effort. Today, we and the CIA are integrated at virtually every level of our operations. From Director Mueller's daily meetings with George Tenet and with CIA officials at his twice-daily threat briefings, to our joint efforts in transnational investigations, to our coordinated threat analysis at the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), the FBI and the CIA have enhanced our interaction at every level. This integration will be further enhanced later this year when the FBI's Counterterrorism Division (CTD) collocates with the CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC) and the TTIC at a new facility in Virginia.

We have also worked hard to break down the walls that have, at times, hampered coordination with our 750,000 partners in state and local law enforcement. We have more than doubled the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) since 9/11. We have processed thousands of security clearances to permit law enforcement officers to share freely in our investigative information. We have created and refined new information sharing systems that electronically link us with our domestic partners. And, we have brought on an experienced police chief from North Carolina to serve as our State and Local Law Enforcement Coordinator.

2. Given these lessons learned, what specific and concrete remedial measures is the FBI, working with Federal, State and local partners, taking to ensure that the organization has enhanced its capacity to prevent future such catastrophic terrorist attacks on the homeland?

Response:

Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has undertaken a number of initiatives to improve information sharing and coordination with our national and international partners. We began by quickly increasing the number of JTTFs across the country, bringing the number up from 35 to 84 nationwide. The JTTFs partner FBI personnel with hundreds of investigators from various federal, state, and local agencies and are important force multipliers in the fight against terrorism.

We also established a National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), staffed by representatives from 38 federal, state, and local

agencies. The NJTTF conducts liaison with the local JTTFs and other participating agencies and acts as a conduit for information on terrorist threats and leads. The mission of the NJTTF is to enhance communication, coordination, and cooperation by acting as the "hub" of support for the JTTFs throughout the United States, providing a point of fusion for intelligence acquired in support of counterterrorism (CT) operations. In order to fulfill this mission, the NJTTF has coordinated efforts to establish the FBI's Law Enforcement Online (LEO) virtual private network as the primary Internet-based information sharing platform for all law enforcement agencies in the United States. LEO operates in a "law enforcement sensitive" environment, enabling any law enforcement agency with a LEO account and an Internet connection to share terrorism information with JTTFs. The NJTTF is also working with LEO and the FBI's Office of Law Enforcement Coordination (OLEC) on the FBI Electronic National Alert System, which instantly notifies law enforcement of incidents that need immediate attention. This system was implemented in October 2003 and distributes instant messages directly to the LEO accounts and personal electronic devices (e.g., pagers, personal digital assistants, and cell phones) of participating law enforcement officials.

In February 2002, the FBI disseminated the first FBI Intelligence Bulletin. Since then, more than 120 bulletins have gone out to more than 18,000 law enforcement agencies and 60 United States Government agencies and their subcomponents, as well as government agencies in the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. The FBI Intelligence Bulletin is disseminated every Wednesday, with additional Special Edition Bulletins issued as circumstances warrant through four mechanisms: LEO, the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS), the National Threat Warning System teletype, and the Regional Information Sharing System.

In May 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the FBI, the CIA, the State Department, and the Department of Defense established the TTIC to assess terrorism related intelligence collected domestically and abroad in order to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture. This summer, the TTIC, along with a portion of the FBI's CTD and the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI's) CTC, will be collocated in a single new facility.

On December 1, 2003, the FBI, in conjunction with DHS, the State Department, and members of the USIC, stood up the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). The mission of the TSC is to use information derived from the USIC and law enforcement agencies to identify known or suspected terrorists who have particular interactions with United States authorities, such as being pulled over during routine traffic stops, being screened while attempting to enter the United States, or applying for a visa overseas. The TSC will consolidate unclassified identifiers from United States Government terrorist databases and provide 24/7

operational support for thousands of federal, state, and local screeners across the country and around the world. The TSC will ensure that government investigators, screeners, and agents are working off the same unified, comprehensive set of anti-terrorist information, and that they have access to information and expertise that will allow them to act quickly when a suspected terrorist is screened or stopped. In its first two-and-a-half months of operation, the TSC received 1,848 calls from state, federal, and local law enforcement personnel, based on potential matches with known terrorists. This resulted in the positive identification of 740 individuals, some of whom have been apprehended and some of whom have been developed as informants or subjected to surveillance. On March 11, 2004, the TSC began using the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). The TSDB is the result of TSC's efforts to consolidate disparate information currently held by multiple agencies and used in different ways into one unclassified law enforcement sensitive database that contains identifying information regarding known or suspected terrorists. The TSDB serves a single purpose -- to help identify and detain potential terrorists in order to prevent future terrorist attacks.

On December 3, 2003, the FBI created the OLEC to enhance the FBI's cooperation and substantive relationships with its state and local law enforcement counterparts. The OLEC, which is run by a former Chief of Police, also has liaison responsibilities with the White House Homeland Security Council.

In addition, the FBI has moved to enhance the capabilities of its international Legal Attaché (Legat) offices. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, and throughout the following year, FBI Legats facilitated the rapid deployment of approximately 700 FBI personnel overseas. Last year, FBI Legats handled approximately 53,000 leads. The FBI's Legat program currently consists of 46 offices around the world, and new offices have been opened or are projected to open in the following locations: Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Sanaa, Yemen; Tbilisi, Georgia; and Tunis, Tunisia. In addition, the FBI is reviewing the possibility of establishing sub-offices of three existing Legats: in Bonn, Germany (Legat Berlin); Milan, Italy (Legat Rome); and Toronto, Canada (Legat Ottawa). The Legats in Amman, Islamabad, Manila, Ottawa, Riyadh, and Cairo are being augmented with additional personnel.

Improved Analytical and Intelligence Capabilities

In October 2001, the FBI established a College of Analytical Studies (CAS) in order to provide training for all FBI analytical support personnel. The curriculum was developed with the recommendations and participation of the CIA, the Joint Military Intelligence College, and private educational institutions. The training includes basic and advanced courses at Quantico, as well as CIA courses. Last year, more than 900 analysts completed six-week training courses. This training,

combined with stepped-up recruitment efforts, have allowed the FBI to dramatically increase the number of analysts dedicated to CT, from 218 in FY 2001 to 461 last year. The FBI's FY 2004 appropriation includes 872 analysts.

By February 2002, the FBI had established an Intelligence Program and had "stood up" its Office of Intelligence (OI), led by an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence. The OI is staffed by FBI and CIA analysts who examine intelligence and ensure it is shared within the FBI, among JTTFs, and with TTIC and the rest of the USIC. In addition, the OI designs and manages a high-level daily intelligence product for the Director and other key FBI executives. This product helps prepare the Director for his daily briefings of the President and the Attorney General. In the period from October 2002 to September 2003, the FBI produced 2,425 Intelligence Reports.

The FBI has always operated as both a law enforcement and an intelligence agency based on its dual mission to investigate and arrest the perpetrators of completed crimes (the "law enforcement mission") and to collect intelligence that will help prevent future crimes and assist policy makers in their decision making (the "intelligence mission"). History has shown that the FBI is most effective in protecting the United States when it performs these two missions in tandem.

Revised Training Curriculum for New Agents

The FBI has expanded the integration of CT and counterintelligence (CI) training into every facet of New Agents training. Since September 11, 2001, an additional 32 hours of CT and CI training have been added to the curriculum, for a total of 55 hours. Last year, a number of additional in-service courses were offered, including: Basic International Terrorism Operations, Basic Analyst School, Advanced Analytical courses, and CT Management for field supervisors. In addition, all FBI field offices provide eight hours of CT awareness training.

Enhanced Language Translation Capability

The FBI's approximately 1,200 translators are stationed across 52 field offices and Headquarters, and are now connected via secure networks that allow a translator in one FBI office to work on projects for any other office. Since the beginning of FY 2001, the FBI has recruited and processed more than 30,000 translator applicants. These efforts have resulted in the addition of nearly 700 new linguists with a "Top Secret" security clearance.

In addition, shortly after September 11, 2001, the FBI formed a Language Services Translation Center to act as a "command and control" center to coordinate translator assignments and maximize its capacity to render immediate translation assistance. On February 11, 2003, in accordance with the USA PATRIOT Act,

the Director of the CIA established the National Virtual Translation Center and designated the FBI as its Executive Agent. Like the Language Services Translation Center, this Center acts as a clearinghouse to provide timely translations for USIC agencies.

Increased Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Collection

FISA coverage has increased significantly since September 11, 2001, reflecting both the FBI's increased focus on CT and CI investigations and improvement in the operation of the FISA process. From 2001 to 2003, the number of FISA applications filed annually with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court increased by 85 percent. The FISA Court's granting of such FISAs has helped the FBI investigate terrorist networks and operations and disrupt terrorist plots. In addition, the USA PATRIOT Act made a number of important changes to FISA procedures that have assisted the FBI's CT efforts. The most important of these was the dismantling of many of the walls between criminal and intelligence operations. This has given the FBI the ability to coordinate its intelligence and criminal investigations and to use the full range of investigative tools against suspected terrorists.

For example, on the intelligence side of an investigation, the FBI can: conduct surveillance on a suspected terrorist to learn about his movements and to identify possible confederates; obtain FISA authority to monitor his conversations; and/or approach and attempt to cultivate him as a source or an operational asset. On the criminal side, the FBI now has the option of incapacitating the suspect through arrest, detention, and prosecution. Lowering the wall allows the FBI to continuously balance the opportunity to develop intelligence against the need to apprehend the suspect and prevent him from carrying out his terrorist plans. This integrated approach has allowed the FBI to foil terrorist plots from Seattle, Washington, to Detroit, Michigan, to Lackawanna, New York.

Specialized New CT Units

On September 11, 2001, the FBI established the CT Watch Unit (then called the "Executive Watch") as the FBI's 24-hour central clearinghouse for terrorist threats and actionable intelligence. As the FBI's "Threat Central," CT Watch is the focal point for the receipt, preliminary analysis, and immediate assignment for action of all terrorism threats. It ensures that all FBI Field Offices and Legats, all relevant government leaders and agencies, all JTTFs, and all state and local law enforcement agencies receive timely notification of terrorist threats. CT Watch is also responsible for producing several daily publications, including:

• The Director's Daily Briefing Book, which contains a daily update on all significant threat information and current terrorism investigations.

- The FBI Daily CT Update, which contains a summary of significant ongoing or very recent incidents that may be terrorism related.

- The Daily Intelligence Summary, which contains a daily update of significant intelligence collected concerning terrorist operations.

The FBI also established the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS), which is devoted entirely to the financial aspects of terrorism investigations. TFOS has focused on information sharing and the abilities of the JTTFs and Criminal Investigative units in the field to identify, predict, and prevent future criminal enterprises. In cooperation with the financial services industry, the FBI has frozen more than \$172 million in financial assets from organizations that support terrorism.

In early 2002, the FBI created "Flying Squads" to provide rapid, highly mobile support for terrorism investigations around the globe. These teams have expertise in CT, FISA requirements, foreign languages, and intelligence analysis, as well as specialized knowledge of al Qaeda and familiarity with the USIC.

In December 2002, the FBI established the Communications Exploitation Section, which analyzes terrorist electronic and telephone communications and identifies terrorist associations and networks. The following month, we established the Document Exploitation Unit, which identifies and disseminates intelligence gleaned from millions of pages of documents and computer data seized overseas by intelligence agencies.

Restructuring of CTD Branches

In order to improve our ability to address the terrorist threat, CTD has been restructured. The basic structure and the recent changes designed to make CTD more effective in this mission follow.

CTD is comprised of three Branches: CT Operations, CT Analysis, and Operational Support.

CT Operations Branch

The CT Operations Branch supports, coordinates, and manages terrorism-related investigations. This Branch is comprised of four sections.

- The International Terrorism Operations Section I supports, coordinates, and provides oversight of FBI international CT operations related to al Qaeda and other Sunni extremist groups.

- The International Terrorism Operations Section II supports, coordinates, and provides oversight of FBI international CT operations related to other groups, such as Hizballah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well as the terrorist threat from state sponsors of terrorism.

- The Domestic Terrorism/Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Section supports, coordinates, and provides oversight of FBI domestic CT operations, including animal rights extremists and eco-terrorists. In addition, this Section's Special Events Unit plays a major role in planning, coordinating, and managing support to field offices charged with CT responsibilities for special events such as the Super Bowl, the Olympic Games, and the Republican and Democratic National Conventions.

- The Terrorism Reports and Requirements Section (TRRS) oversees the dissemination of raw intelligence reports and implements policies and procedures established by the OI. Since its inception in 2002, TRRS has disseminated more than 2,800 intelligence information reports to members of the intelligence, policy, and law enforcement communities. When possible, these reports have been produced at the unclassified level in order to allow rapid information sharing with state and local security entities.

Operational Support Branch

The Operational Support Branch is comprised of three sections: National Threat Center Section, CT Operational Response Section, and Terrorist Financing Operations Section. The National Threat Center and CT Operational Response Sections have been reorganized to better accomplish CTD's mission.

- The National Threat Center Section administers CT Watch, which is discussed above, as well as four other units relating to threat management.

1. The Threat Monitoring Unit (TMU) supports the FBI's operational role in defending the United States from the threat of terrorism by receiving, assessing, and disseminating threat information and information regarding suspicious activities in conjunction with FBIHQ, FBI Field Offices, Legats, and the USIC. Each month, the TMU processes approximately 1,000 threat and suspicious activity referrals from various federal, state, and local governmental and law enforcement agencies, ensuring that the appropriate FBI units, JTTFs, and other government agencies are expeditiously apprized of the threat information. In addition, more than 2,700 significant threat and suspicious activity reports have been recorded into a searchable database of TMU threats.

2. The Public Access Center Unit (PACU) provides the public with safe, reliable, and effective avenues to report information regarding terrorist and other

criminal activity to the FBI via the Internet and a toll-free telephone hotline. The PACU, which receives and disseminates approximately 100 threat leads per month, also analyzes and processes this information for FBI investigative and intelligence purposes and for dissemination to appropriate federal, state, local, and international organizations. The FBI and DHS developed a 120-day pilot program in which the FBI will route all DHS web site tip information to the FBI tip web site for processing by the PACU. The PACU will then provide DHS with the ability to view and track the work flow related to these tips in real-time and to receive immediate notification when the FBI requests assistance from its field offices.

3. The Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit (TWWU) provides current terrorist-related intelligence information and analysis to a broad spectrum of users through the FBI's Intelligence Bulletin discussed above. In addition, the TWWU produces Special Event Threat Assessments that provide localized strategic threat analysis for field offices and local law enforcement agencies hosting large-scale special events such as the Super Bowl, New Year's Eve festivities, and the President's State of the Union address. The TWWU has disseminated over 140 Special Event Threat Assessments and updates. The TWWU is also responsible for the FBI's Terrorist Watch List (TWL), which is available to nationwide law enforcement through the National Crime Information Center. The TWL contains names of current subjects of FBI CT investigations.

4. The Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) is primarily an administrative unit which supports the flow of information among the various FBI units and between the FBI and outside agencies. Information concerning significant incidents and case updates is communicated to SIOC via telephone, e-mail, and fax, and is immediately routed by the SIOC staff to the appropriate outside agencies, FBIHQ Units, FBI Field Offices and/or Legats. SIOC also disseminates NLETS messages to government agencies throughout the U. S. and publishes the "SIOC Morning Report," a daily summary of pertinent intelligence articles from the FBI and other USIC elements, which is distributed to FBI Field Offices and to JTTF members across the country.

The CT Operational Response Section lends critical support in three areas: supporting the NJTTF, coordinating deployment of the Headquarters-based Flying Squads and the field office-based Rapid Deployment Teams, and conducting liaison with the Department of Defense (including the management of FBI personnel working with the military in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and in Afghanistan).

CT Analysis Branch

The CT Analysis Branch oversees the bulk of CTD's intelligence functions, including analysis, evidence exploitation, and the preparation and dissemination of finished intelligence products and briefing materials. The CT Analysis Branch operates with the guidance and oversight of the FBI's OI and is a vital part of the FBI's enterprise-wide intelligence program. This Branch is comprised of two sections.

The CT Analysis Section includes five units whose areas of focus mirror those of the sections in the CT Operations Branch (though this is not a one-for-one unit-to-section match because the alignments differ somewhat). In support of the FBI's CT operations, these units examine the composition, activities, tradecraft, ideology, and linkages of terrorist groups, and they assess terrorist activities and threats in order to assist FBI managers in making decisions about deployments and the allocation of resources.

The Communication Exploitation Section processes and disseminates information derived from the full range of media. This Section is an essential participant in the National Document Exploitation Center process.

3. In what time frame will these changes be implemented?

Response:

The changes outlined above have been implemented. With the FBI CTD's relocation with TTIC and components of the CIA in the summer of 2004, the FBI's reorganization will be nearly complete.

4. How would you assess your progress thus far?

Response:

While the FBI still has much work to do, the Bureau is moving forward steadily and in the right direction. Working with our partners in the United States and abroad, we have disrupted and detained supporters of al Qaeda from Lackawanna, New York, to Portland, Oregon; we have participated in the detention of much of al Qaeda's leadership; and we have seized millions of dollars in terrorist financing.

With the recent creation of an intelligence agent career track and the implementation of administrative reforms related to building an intelligence workforce, the FBI has in place the essential structural elements of an intelligence-driven CT operation. The challenge now is to refine and continue to

develop that operation – an effort that will require resources, continued attention by FBI leadership, and constant training of FBI personnel in intelligence processes and objectives.

While the FBI has clearly made substantial progress over the past 2 1/2 years, it is difficult to measure with precision the current effectiveness of its CT efforts. Besides citing the absence of successful attacks on the homeland since September 11, 2001, there is no single measure that completely captures the progress made. There are several yardsticks, however that demonstrate the effectiveness of the core functions of a CT Program. These yardsticks include, and show progress in, the following areas:

1. Development of human assets
2. Number of FISAs
3. Quality of daily briefings
4. Effectiveness of CT operations
5. Continued protection of civil liberties

Success Stories

Of course, the most important aspect of all of these changes and reorganizations is the degree to which they have aided the FBI in disrupting and destroying terrorist threats. Following are a few of the FBI's success stories.

The Lackawanna Six

On September 13, 2002, the FBI arrested five United States citizens near Buffalo, New York (Sahim Alwan, Faysal Galab, Yahya Goba, Shafal Mosed, and Yasein Taher), charging them with "providing, attempting to provide, and conspiring to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization." In addition, Mukhtar Albakri, also a United States citizen, was rendered from Bahrain to the United States pursuant to an arrest warrant on the same charges. All six individuals were indicted on these charges on October 21, 2002. The arrests and indictments were based on information indicating that these individuals traveled to an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan in the spring/summer of 2001, where they received military training and were visited by Usama Bin Laden. All six subjects pled guilty to terrorist-related charges and received prison sentences ranging between seven and ten years. These subjects are also cooperating with ongoing terrorist investigations and have provided significant information.

Benevolence International Foundation

Enaam Arnout was the Executive Director of the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF). BIF was a Chicago, Illinois-based charity long recognized by

the IRS as a non-profit organization. The group's purposefully ambiguous objectives were, ostensibly, to provide humanitarian relief aid. However, the recipients of the "humanitarian aid" were ultimately revealed to be terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda. Arnout was indicted in October 2002. The indictment described a multi-national criminal enterprise that, for at least as decade, used charitable donations from unwitting Muslim-Americans, non-Muslims, and corporations to covertly support Al-Qaeda, the Chechen Mujahideen, and armed violence in Bosnia. The indictment alleged that BIF was operated as a criminal enterprise that engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. In addition to fund-raising, the group acted as a conduit through which other material support was provided to further the violent activities of the mujahideen and other terrorist organizations. Arnout ultimately pled guilty to a material-support based racketeering conspiracy violation and admitted that donors to BIF were misled into believing their donations would support peaceful causes when, in fact, funds were expended to support violence overseas.

Portland, Oregon

On October 3, 2002, six individuals were indicted on federal charges in the District of Oregon. The six (Ahmed Bilal, his brother, Mohammad Bilal, Habes Al Saoub, Patrice Ford, Jeffrey Battle, and October Lewis) were charged with conspiracy to levy war against the United States, conspiracy to provide material support and resources to a terrorist organization, conspiracy to contribute services to al Qaeda and the Taliban, and possessing firearms in furtherance of crimes of violence. The following day, Battle, Ford, and Lewis were arrested in Portland and Muhammad Bilal was arrested in Detroit. Several days later, Ahmed Bilal was apprehended in Malaysia and returned to the United States. With the exception of Al-Saoub, these subjects have pled guilty to terrorism related and money laundering charges and have received federal sentences ranging from three to eighteen years. The only subject who has not been brought to justice, Al Saoub, is believed to have been killed in Pakistan by Pakistani military authorities.

Earnest James Ujamma

On July 22, 2002, Earnest James Ujamma, aka Bilal Ahmed, was arrested on a material witness warrant. Ahmed is suspected of being involved in a terrorist training facility in Bly, Oregon, and providing other material support to terrorism. On August 28, 2002, he was indicted on charges of conspiracy to provide material support and resources to a terrorist organization and possessing firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence. Bilal Ahmed is an American-born Muslim convert who has worked for and provided services to Abu Hamza al-Masri. These services included taking computers to the Taliban prior to United States action in Afghanistan, as well as introducing a current Guantanamo Bay detainee to individuals at al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, enabling their matriculation into a terror training camp. Ahmed was under investigation based

on information that he (on behalf of the Egyptian-born Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Masri of the Finsbury Park Mosque in London) provided material support to terrorism by attempting to establish a training camp in southern Oregon, pursuant to Hamza's jihad recruiting program, and served as Hamza's representative for the delivery of cash, computer hardware and software, and at least one combatant to Taliban and al Qaeda activities inside Afghanistan. Ujamma has pled guilty to terrorism-related charges and has received a two-year sentence. This investigation, coupled with Ujamma's cooperation, has provided a wealth of intelligence with respect to additional terrorist targets, which is being pursued aggressively.

Holy Land Foundation

The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) is registered as a nonprofit humanitarian organization that has conducted fund-raising activities in the United States. In December 2001, the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated HLF as a Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT) based on information that HLF provided material support to HAMAS. InfoCom, a computer company and Internet Service Provider closely associated with HLF, is being investigated for providing material support to terrorism and for making illegal shipments to state sponsors of terrorism in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. As a result of a superceding indictment related to the InfoCom investigation, the Dallas Division arrested four suspects who had been indicted on money laundering, conspiracy, and terrorist support charges. Two additional suspects were also indicted, however, they are in fugitive status and remain at large. The four individuals arrested on these charges are expected to go to trial in the immediate future. It is important to note that one of the fugitives is Mousa Marzook, allegedly a Deputy Head of the HAMAS Political Bureau and an SDT.

Jewish Defense League

Investigation by the Los Angeles JTTF revealed that Irving Rubin and Earl Krugel were active members of the Jewish Defense League, a known violent extremist Jewish Organization. A Cooperating Witness reported statements made by Rubin and Krugel indicating a plan to attack the Islamic Muslim Public Affairs Council (IMPAC) office in Los Angeles or possibly the California office of United States Congressman Darrell Issa. Statements made by Krugel indicated the motivation for the attack was to serve as a "wake up call" to the Muslim Community. Rubin and Krugel were arrested by members of the Los Angeles JTTF for conspiring to build and place an improvised explosive device at the IMPAC office. Irving Rubin committed suicide and Earl Krugel's charges are pending.

Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh

Daniel Pearl, South Asia Bureau Chief for the *Wall Street Journal*, was kidnaped in Pakistan on January 23, 2002, and subsequently murdered. The Newark Field

Office assumed the investigation due to the fact that the kidnaping was perpetrated via internet email through the Dow Jones/Wall Street Journal's computer server system, which is located in South Brunswick, New Jersey. As a result of exceptional international law enforcement and USIC cooperation, Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheik, a British national and Islamic radical, was apprehended in Pakistan in early February 2002. As a result of investigative work into the source of the e-mailed ransom communications, three other Pakistani nationals B Fahad Naseem, Salman Saqib, and Sheik Mohamed Adeel B were also apprehended. All four were charged and convicted under Pakistani law for Pearl's abduction and murder. Sheik was sentenced to death by hanging and the other three were sentenced to 25 years in prison.

KKK

On February 12 and 13, 2003, Joshua Caleb Sutter and Davis Wayne Hull, Imperial Wizard of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, were arrested on a range of charges, including teaching or demonstrating the making and use of a destructive device, selling illegal weapons, and corruptly persuading a witness with intent to influence his or her testimony. A search warrant on Hull's property uncovered fifteen firearms and some pipe bomb components. Sutter pled guilty to weapons violations and awaits sentencing. Hull was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on May 13, 2003, and his matter is pending trial.

Earth Liberation Front

Pursuant to an FBI investigation, John Wade, Adam Blackwell, and Aaron Linas pled guilty to maliciously damaging and destroying vehicles, houses, and other property in the Richmond, Virginia area during the summer and fall of 2002. The incidents were claimed on behalf of the Earth Liberation Front, and total damages were estimated at approximately \$225,000. On April 12, 2004, Aaron Linas was sentenced to 42 months in federal prison. Wade and Blackwell await sentencing.

5. By what qualitative and quantitative criteria is the FBI assessing its performance on intelligence reform?

Response:

The FBI has launched a multi-pronged effort to measure progress on intelligence reform. This effort includes the creation of binary metrics (has an objective been achieved or not), qualitative measures that evaluate more abstract objectives (such as customer satisfaction and employee morale), and quantitative measures that provide statistical evaluation of performance (such as the number of intelligence requirements met and the number of new sources developed). These metrics have been published in the FBI's "Strategic Direction" Concept of Operations (CONOPS) as follows.

Intelligence Policy Success Metrics:

- Production and dissemination of policy manual
- Elimination of redundant policy documents
- Production and dissemination of standards for intelligence products
- Percentage of intelligence products meeting standards

Intelligence Process Metrics:

- Percentage of identified intelligence requirements met and gaps filled
- Establishment of a Field Intelligence Group (FIG) in every field office
- Establishment of intelligence-based targeting and source development in each office
- Development and maintenance of Intelligence Collection Capability Baseline
- Development and maintenance of intelligence analyst capability

Threat-based Management Success Metrics:

- Production and maintenance of an FBI threat forecast
- Percentage of intelligence-driven investigations
- Workforce experience, education, and demographics
- Capability Maturity Model for Human Talent
- Capability Maturity Model for analytic tools
- Budget impact model for assigning value to sources

Customer Service Metrics:

- Percentage of Products disseminated and at what classification level
- Percentage of products disseminated for each National Intelligence Priority
- Analysis of customer feedback responses

In addition to the above, the OI and the Inspection Division have partnered to create an intelligence inspection checklist for use in inspections. The Inspection Division has also developed a series of performance metrics for the implementation of the intelligence program in each investigative division. Finally, the FBI is considering the inclusion of two intelligence-related critical elements in the performance reviews of each FBI agent. Those elements specify the development of sources and the production of intelligence as critical performance criteria for agents.

6. Are you modeling your intelligence reform efforts on the intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, or some other U.S. Intelligence Community entity?

Response:

The FBI has modeled its intelligence program on the traditional intelligence cycle used by all intelligence entities, including those identified in the question. Through the intelligence cycle: 1) intelligence information priorities are identified by national-level officials, 2) collection strategies are developed by analysts and communicated to collectors, who then collect the information by developing appropriate sources, 3) the analysis and evaluation of collected intelligence is converted into intelligence products, 4) intelligence products are disseminated to consumers inside and outside the FBI, and 5) a feedback mechanism is created to provide collectors, analysts, and collection strategy developers with consumers' evaluations of intelligence value. To ensure uniform implementation of these processes, the OI led an FBI-wide effort in 2003 to develop and promulgate a CONOPS for each process. In addition, the FBI has developed implementation plans for each CONOPS and implementation is tracked through a master schedule.

While the intelligence cycle outlined above is common to all intelligence entities, the mechanisms by which it is implemented are tailored to the overall missions of the organizations in which they are housed. The FBI has implemented the intelligence cycle according to four core principles: 1) the independence of the intelligence requirements and collection management process from operations, 2) the integration of intelligence production and operations, 3) the standardization of intelligence processes and policy by the OI and the execution of those processes and policies by all operational divisions, both at headquarters and in the field, and 4) the matrix management of all analysts, with performance rating accomplished by operational entities and performance review accomplished by intelligence entities to ensure that analyst standards are maintained.

7. Are you modeling your reform based on any other democratic country's internal intelligence service? Have you looked at the structure and operation of other such systems? If so, what have you concluded?

Response:

The FBI has studied extensively the mechanisms and structures according to which other democracies perform domestic intelligence production, and has benefitted greatly from a number of independent analyses of these structures and processes, most notably from the recent study by the RAND Corporation. We have reached three fundamental conclusions from our review: 1) each domestic intelligence service is charged with performing the same basic functions; 2) each nation has built organizations to perform those functions that best leverage their larger federal and municipal structures, and 3) no organizational construct is sufficient in and of itself to eliminate "seams" in information sharing.

In building our intelligence program, the FBI adopted the best practices of other democratic countries. For example, from the British Security Service (BSS, formerly MI-5) model, the FBI learned the benefits of a single focus on intelligence source development, and adopted this principle by creating a requirements and collection management element independent from the FBI's investigative divisions and staffed by full-time targeting analysts who drive source development to fill critical intelligence gaps. The BSS relies heavily on municipal law enforcement entities to collect intelligence information on its behalf. In the United States, state, local, and tribal law enforcement entities are also powerful collectors of information. The FBI has implemented its intelligence requirements and collection management processes in such a way that they leverage the capacity of our partners in law enforcement.

From the French Service the FBI adopted the principle of integrating investigative law enforcement and intelligence operations, and implements this principle by integrating intelligence production elements in each of the FBI's operational divisions, both at headquarters and in the field. Following is a matrix which identifies some of the domestic intelligence functions discussed in the RAND Corporation study (and used by the FBI to guide the development of our intelligence program) and indicates how these functions are implemented in the FBI.

MISC. REQ. #53

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INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS COMPARISON

Domestic Intelligence Functions in Fellow Democracies:	FBI Intelligence Functions: (CONOPS)	Responsible Authority	Execution
Develop needs and task collectors	Requirements and Collection Management	Office of Intelligence	Office of Intelligence with Operational Divisions
Collect intelligence information	Field Intelligence Operations	Office of Intelligence	Field Intelligence Groups
Provide in-house analytical training	Human Talent Forecast and Plan for Human Talent	Office of Intelligence	Office of Intelligence / Training and Development Division / Administrative Services Division
Identify, assess, and monitor potential threats to the homeland	Requirements and Collection Management / Intelligence Assessment / Production and Use Forecast	Office of Intelligence	Office of Intelligence / Operational Divisions / Field Intelligence Groups
Establish and update database of potential threats	Information Sharing	Office of Intelligence	Operational Divisions / Field Intelligence Groups
Share information with domestic partners – police, intelligence community, executive and legislative branches	Production and Use / Assessment / Information Sharing / Customer Relations	Office of Intelligence	Operational Divisions / Field Intelligence Groups
Share information and coordinate with foreign agencies	Production and Use / Assessment / Information Sharing / Customer Relations	Office of Intelligence	Operational Divisions / Field Intelligence Groups
Program Intelligence Resources	Forecast / Manage Resources / Strategic Intelligence Plan	Office of Intelligence	All

"Confronting the Enemy Within," RAND
Report, Nov03
[Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Australia]

8. The FBI has attempted twice before in the past two decades to integrate its intelligence programs. The first initiative - also known as the Office of Intelligence - was an attempt by an FBI Deputy Director to integrate intelligence across the criminal and national security programs of the FBI. It did not achieve its desired result, and the organization was later folded into the second initiative to integrate intelligence, and particularly intelligence analysis, across the FBI - the formation of the Investigative Services Division (ISD). The ISD was disbanded shortly after the events of 9/11/2001. The Committee understands that the events of 9/11/2001 have dramatically increased the importance of leveraging intelligence to counter terrorism, but are there any systemic obstacles which were responsible for the failure of these past two efforts that remain in place and may undermine existing efforts at intelligence reform?

Response:

These previous attempts were not without concrete achievement and those who conceived them should be applauded for their efforts. Both of these efforts were launched when various walls existed that prevented the implementation of the vision. Legal walls prevented the integration of intelligence and criminal tools to combat terrorism. Cultural walls -- real and perceived -- between the FBI, the CIA, and other members of the USIC were problematic. Operational walls -- real and perceived -- between FBI efforts and those of our partners in state, local, and international law enforcement were also problematic. Today those walls are coming down. The USA PATRIOT Act, the revised Attorney General Guidelines, and a FISA Court of Review opinion tore down legal walls between intelligence and law enforcement. We no longer need to develop parallel intelligence and criminal cases because of restrictions on information sharing. We have also improved our relationship with the CIA and other members of the USIC and are integrated with them at every level. Within months, the FBI's CTD, the CIA's CTC, and the TTIC will collocate. We have also strengthened our relationship with our state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners through the creation of 86 JTTFs.

All of the above is not to say that we are yet where we want to be. The transformation of the FBI into a world-class intelligence organization will require strong leadership, hard work, patience, time, and resources. The FBI can provide the leadership, hard work, and patience. With the support of the Committee, the FBI is confident that we will also have the time and resources we need to achieve the results the nation requires.

INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

1. The FBI is in the process of establishing a formal intelligence cycle. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 13, the Director stated that "... the intelligence cycle of requirements, collection, analysis, dissemination, and feedback always was and is now carried out..." across the FBI. The Director also stated that the USA PATRIOT Act allowed the FBI "... to move from thinking about 'intelligence as a case' to finding 'intelligence in the case'....". Do you see any contradictions or synergies between the gathering of evidence to support legal proceedings and the collection of intelligence based on previously identified gaps in national intelligence to prevent terrorist attacks or espionage activities?

Response:

We see enormous synergies between the two activities and, because of the tearing down of the walls between criminal and intelligence activities, the FBI is now able realize those synergies. First, National Intelligence Requirements are generated based on national security issues articulated by the President through his advisors on National Security and Homeland Security. The FBI's law enforcement priorities are fully represented in those requirements and the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI participate in quarterly National Security Council Principals' Meetings devoted to the review of intelligence requirements. The new Attorney General Guidelines allow us to develop positive intelligence without first opening a case, and the FISA Court of Appeals ruling eliminated the need to open parallel criminal and intelligence cases and to maintain a wall between them. For that reason, the CTD has adopted the Model Counterterrorism Investigative Strategy (MCIS) in which all cases are opened as intelligence cases.

The FBI brings enormous strengths to the development of sources and the analysis of information precisely because of its history of gathering evidence to support legal proceedings. Because it is accustomed to the need for witnesses and evidence that will withstand the scrutiny of judicial review, the FBI brings a rigor and discipline to source development and analytic work that should serve as a model for theUSIC.

The need to protect classified information within court proceedings is sometimes viewed as a contradiction between evidence gathering and intelligence collection. The legal framework created by FISA and the Classified Information Procedures Act has for the past 25 years successfully supported criminal prosecutions involving classified information.

2. If the starting point for the FBI's intelligence related activities remains a case, presumably opened due to some inimical activity, how is the FBI being proactive in preventing the next catastrophic terrorist attack?

Response:

The starting point for FBI intelligence activities is the intelligence requirement, not the "case." Intelligence requirements directly reflect national security priorities and serve as predication for the opening of cases designed to prevent acts of harm to the nation. In the FBI, the "case" is the vehicle for organizing investigative work. Because the starting point for the FBI intelligence program is an intelligence requirement, we ensure that FBI cases are opened to develop the information we must obtain to prevent not only terrorist activities, but also hostile intelligence operations, cyber attacks, and criminal activities that would harm our nation.

3. Prior to the creation of the Office of Intelligence in late 2001, could you explain how the intelligence cycle worked within the FBI? For example, how would a tasking for domestic intelligence collection from another member of the U.S. Intelligence Community be communicated across the FBI, and then a response back to requesting party?

Response:

In late 2001, an OI was created in CTD. This represented Stage One of the FBI's efforts to develop an enterprise-wide intelligence program, and focused largely on aligning intelligence production efforts with national priorities and developing standards for analyst training and performance. Stage Two of our efforts focused on creating a robust analytic capability in CTD with the help of 25 analysts detailed to the FBI from the CIA. Stage Three of our efforts was the creation of an FBI-wide intelligence program to ensure uniform implementation of the intelligence cycle across all investigative programs.

Prior to the creation of the OI in early 2003, the FBI's intelligence cycle was implemented in each of the investigative programs. Requests from other agencies went directly to those investigative programs, often facilitated by liaison officers at each organization's respective headquarters. Except where tasking was associated with a specific operational lead to one or more field offices, there was no mechanism to ensure a response was provided to the requesting party. Similarly, there was no single center responsible for ensuring that other interested parties knew or had access to the response. Most importantly, the requests for information rarely crossed investigative programs and, as a consequence, the full breadth of FBI collection assets was not mobilized in response to the request.

4. How did the creation of the Office of Intelligence change this process?

Response:

The OI, created in 2003, leveraged the best practices of individual investigative divisions to formulate a formal and well-defined process for managing intelligence requirements and collection which is common to all FBI programs. We have instituted a formal request for information process that ensures that all requestors of information receive responses (including negative responses) and are updated on efforts to meet their needs throughout the process. We execute that process through our Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management Unit (IRCMU), which provides a single point of entry for all information requests. The IRCMU represents the FBI on the DCI's National Intelligence Collection Board and ensures that USIC taskings are passed to FBI field offices through the FIGs. The performance of FIGs is measured by the extent to which they have been able to fulfill intelligence requirements.

5. The Office of Intelligence's Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management Unit is responsible for establishing a system for the development and fulfillment of intelligence collection requirements. What progress had been made in this area?

Response:

We have made significant progress in this area. The IRCMU was established in June 2003. Since its creation, the FBI has:

- Developed a CONOPS for Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management.
- Developed the first FBI requirements documents, including one set for international terrorism and three sets for criminal issues (alien smuggling, international organized crime, and public corruption).
- Developed and published the FBI Intelligence Collection and Reporting Guidance Manual.
- Developed and published an FBI Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management Process Handbook.
- Developed and delivered Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management Training for all FBI executives, new agents, and new analysts.
- Completed a collection baseline that allows the FBI to determine where we have intelligence gaps with respect to critical national security needs.

6. What qualitative and quantitative criteria are being used to assess performance in this area?

Response:

The FBI outlined its performance metrics for the overall intelligence program, including the IRCM process, in some detail in our answer to # 5 of the "General" questions. Please see that response.

7. How are internally generated intelligence collection requirements prioritized against those which may come to the FBI from other U.S. Intelligence Community members?

Response:

The FBI requirements process uses a single prioritization scheme regardless of the originator of the requirement. That scheme is the DCI's National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF).

8. What process does the FBI use to develop its priority intelligence collection requirements?

Response:

The FBI intelligence requirements process begins with the NIPF. The FBI then overlays on the NIPF the investigative priorities assigned to it in order to ensure that intelligence requirements for which the FBI is both the primary intelligence agency and the lead operational entity are adequately reflected in our collection taskings. Using the IRCM process described above, intelligence collection strategies and collection taskings are then issued to all operational divisions at headquarters and in the field. Full-time targeting analysts in IRCMU are responsible for ensuring targeting strategies are developed and executed to fill intelligence gaps.

9. Are FBI collection requirements consistent with U.S. Intelligence Community collection requirements?

Response:

Yes. FBI collection requirements are based on the DCI's NIPF.

10. In terms of performance evaluations, what specific measures are in place that provide (positive, non-inspection-related) incentives for Special Agent intelligence collectors to fulfill intelligence collection requirements from both the FBI and the U.S. Intelligence Community?

The FBI is considering adding two critical elements to the evaluation of Special Agents' performance. The first focuses on the development of intelligence sources and the second on the production of intelligence.

11. What specific measures has the FBI taken to improve its ability to recruit human assets who may prove beneficial to preventing acts of terrorism directed against the United States?

Response:

Since September 2001, the FBI has increased international terrorism sources by over 60% and domestic terrorism sources by more than 30%. We have achieved this success through a number of efforts, including increased training efforts such as Operation Tripwire, which is designed to increase our intelligence base against critical threats. Beginning this year, we will send Special Agent collectors to the CIA's 32-week case agent training course. In addition, human source development modules from the CIA course will be added to our training programs this year.

ANALYSIS AND THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

1. How does the FBI "know what it doesn't know;" in other words, what process is the FBI using to determine its intelligence gaps?

Response:

The FBI process for determining intelligence gaps begins with the NIPF, which systematizes, at a high level, the totality of United States national intelligence requirements. The FBI applies its capability to collect information on threats to these requirements statements in order to identify intelligence gaps. These intelligence gaps are then used by the FBI's IRCMU to drive the development of targeting and collection strategies. Once strategies are developed, collection taskings are assigned to appropriate field offices. Targeting and collections strategies are developed by the IRCMU with analysts embedded in operational divisions both at headquarters and in the field.

2. Have intelligence "baseline" studies been conducted to determine what the FBI's intelligence universe looks like?

Response:

In February 2004, the FBI completed an intelligence collection baseline, which we call the intelligence capabilities survey. This survey allowed us to capture in a

single database the sum total of intelligence collection resources we can bring to bear on a given threat.

On the analysis side, we have baselined our knowledge of a number of terrorist groups in the United States, the posture of key intelligence services in the United States, and a number of organized crime organizations and gangs in the United States.

3. Which categories of FBI employees are responsible for identifying intelligence gaps?

Response:

All FBI employees (agents, analysts, language analysts, surveillance specialists) identify intelligence gaps in the course of performing their work. The OI's IRCMU is responsible for managing the FBI's efforts to fill these gaps. The IRCMU carries out that responsibility through its dedicated targeting analysts, whose full-time job is to "know what we know" and "know what we must know" to prevent harm to our nation. Together with analysts and agents in investigative divisions, collection strategies are developed to fill intelligence gaps. This same process is carried out in the field through the FIGs.

4. How does the FBI define "strategic" analysis, and how does it differ from the activities of tactical analysis, and the activities of reports officers?

Response:

Strategic analysis is the ability to step back and look broadly at trends. Analysis at this level involves an aggregation of information. Current intelligence is narrower in scope and is comprised of the individual pieces of information that are analyzed in the strategic analysis process. Reports officers have a responsibility to report current intelligence in a way that protects sources and methods, but gets current intelligence to the consumer on a timely basis.

5. Given demands for close case analytical support and the need to rapidly disseminate intelligence to various consumers, do tactical analysts in the field have the time and/or the appropriate analytical skill sets to dedicate to intelligence gap identification, arguably a high-level analytical function?

Response:

Analysts in the field primarily deal with current intelligence derived from field investigative activities. Their mission is critical to supplying intelligence information that is evaluated for gaps, largely through an independent analytic process that is a collaborative effort between FBIHQ analytical components and

the OI's IRCMU. The gap analysis requires us to step back from the day-to-day flow of current intelligence and identify intelligence collection requirements to satisfy the gaps. Through collection taskings, the FBI influences the collection of current intelligence to continue the intelligence cycle.

6. Are strategically oriented intelligence analysts at Headquarters assuming the greatest responsibility for the identification of intelligence gaps? If so, have their performance evaluations been adjusted to reflect this important analytical function?

Response:

Yes, FBIHQ intelligence analysts assume the greatest responsibility for the identification of intelligence gaps, receiving valuable input from field intelligence analysts. The current performance plans for intelligence analyst positions, along with detailed supplemental work role guidance issued throughout the FBI in December 2003, do reflect this important analytic function.

7. How are demands for strategic intelligence analysis at FBI Headquarters being balanced with the need to provide analytical support to FBI executives (briefings etc)?

Response:

The intelligence process is built on the provision of intelligence and the results of intelligence analysis to consumers who need it for operational, strategic, and policy decision-making. Analytic support to FBI executives, in the form of oral briefings and written products, is a natural outgrowth of ongoing current and finished intelligence reporting, and we consider it a valuable part of the intelligence cycle and its analytic processes. These requirements are not mutually exclusive, but are properly parts of balanced support for FBI Executives, which includes the provision of information regarding the strategic analytic process to improve decision-making.

The OI's Strategic Analysis Unit (SAU) is responsible for ensuring that strategic analysis priorities set by the OI are executed by the strategic analysis elements of each of the operational divisions. Each FBI operational division has a robust strategic analytic element that carries out analyses and production according to priorities set by the OI each morning at an FBI-wide intelligence production meeting. Those priorities emanate from both the DCI's NIPF and current intelligence that requires that it be put in context to be fully understood. The SAU produces a daily current intelligence summary and ensures that the imbedded strategic analytic units in the operational divisions produce strategic intelligence, but it does not itself produce strategic intelligence. We have recently embarked on work related to a series of "intelligence campaigns" aimed at ensuring continued focus on our strategic analysis effort.

8. The Committee has provided the FBI with funding for approximately 900 new analysts positions this year. Historically, the FBI has had problems with retention of analysts, particularly when it attempts to quickly absorb large numbers of analysts. How do you plan on hiring so many new analysts?

Response:

The FBI has an aggressive recruitment plan, which includes a marketing campaign, career fairs, and a soon-to-be-implemented quick hire system to expedite the application process. Applications will be reviewed by career boards at FBIHQ and in the Field Offices on a bi-weekly basis. To date, more than 8,000 applications have been received. Through a substantial dedication of resources and process oversight at the executive level, the FBI is committed to absorbing this large number of new analyst hires. As of April 7, 2004, 5061 minimally qualified candidates had been referred to the 56 field offices for selection to fill authorized vacancies through the career board process. FBIHQ divisions have been provided 1210 minimally qualified candidates from which they may select candidates for their authorized positions.

9. How many reports officers are currently on-board, and where are they located?

Response:

The FBI has allocated 124 Intelligence Analysts, 44 at HQ and 80 in the field, to perform the reports officer function. Twenty-three reports officers are currently on-board in the field offices, and 17 more are in the background investigation process. The remaining field positions will be filled from applicants to the FBI's current Intelligence Analyst posting.

10. A one-year infusion of analysts - constituting a 75 percent increase over the current level of analysts - is significant. Please provide a description of your concrete plans for how these analysts will be allocated between headquarters and the field?

Response:

The FBI plans to utilize the new analyst positions in each program as follows:

Counterterrorism:	411:	134 to the field and 277 at headquarters
Counterintelligence:	178:	105 to the field and 73 at headquarters
Criminal:	214:	170 to the field and 44 at headquarters
Cyber:	14:	7 to the field and 7 at headquarters
Total	817	

11. How will these analysts will be utilized (counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal, cyber) both in the field and at headquarters? What is the allocation of these new analysts between and all-source, case support, and reports functions?

Response:

The intelligence analyst position consists of three work roles: reports officer, operations specialist, and all-source analyst. Another position, that of financial analyst, may involve intelligence or other analysis. Currently, the breakdown is as follows.

Counterterrorism: 196 Operations Specialists
66 Reports Officers
149 All-Source Analysts

Counterintelligence: 132 Operations Specialists
46 All-Source Analysts

Criminal: 175 All-Source Analysts
9 Reports Officers
30 Financial Analysts

Cyber: 14 All-Source Analysts

12. What training resources are in place to ensure all these new analysts receive appropriate and timely intelligence analysis training?

Response:

All Intelligence Analysts new to the FBI or new to the analyst position attend the CAS Basic Intelligence Analyst (BIA) course. This course is currently being revised to incorporate a number of core intelligence learning objectives identified by the OI. The FBI has engaged a number of subject matter experts in intelligence analytic tradecraft to work in a collaborative effort with the OI and the Training and Development Division to make a number of important course improvements in the Basic Analyst Course, which will be renamed the Analytic Cadre Educational Strategy (ACES I). As a result of Congressional funding to support FBI Intelligence Analysis Training, a number of fundamental intelligence analysis training modules that are now used within the USIC will be adopted for inclusion in FBI analyst training. The FBI's strategy includes the use of experienced contractors to help identify relevant courses, subject matter experts for training delivery, and a "train the trainer" approach to help build a cadre of effective intelligence analysis instructors within the FBI.

FBI Intelligence Analysts will also have developmental opportunities throughout their careers, including temporary assignments in different functional areas and supplemental training offered throughout the USIC, including training offered by other law enforcement agencies, private vendors, and academic institutions. The Human Talent for Intelligence Production CONOPS articulates the plans for career progression in three tracks (generalist, specialist, and manager), and establishes a framework for Intelligence Analyst career development and training. The Human Talent Development plan also includes the development of a higher-level specialized intelligence analysis course known as ACES II, which will enhance the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the intelligence analyst workforce.

13. It has come to the Committee's attention that the FBI no longer requires new analysts to have a bachelor's degree from an accredited college or university. While such a degree may not guarantee analytical success, some would say it demonstrates a commitment to learning, familiarity with research and analytical methods, and writing skills. What was the rationale for eliminating this requirement?

Response:

The FBI will waive the college degree requirement for those who have intelligence experience. We made that decision because we did not want to artificially limit our ability to hire experienced former military or law enforcement intelligence professionals who could bring great benefit to our intelligence program, but might not possess a college degree. We at the FBI agree that a college degree brings much to our intelligence program; we also believe intelligence experience brings much to our intelligence program. Our introduction of the waiver was designed to ensure we could balance experience with education. We have hired approximately 75 analysts in this fiscal year, and have not yet exercised a waiver.

14. Does the elimination of this requirement exacerbate the FBI's ongoing analytical legacy problem across field offices, where many individuals not having a bachelor degree were promoted into analytical positions?

Response:

No, the degree waiver is only for those individuals who have specific intelligence experience and expertise. All new analysts will have either a degree or demonstrated intelligence experience, and many new hires may have both. The new analysts will work with the FBI's experienced analytical cadre, creating a formidable team working to fulfill the FBI's mission. With respect to the field office intelligence analyst workforce, the FBI is in a unique position, in comparison with the rest of the USIC, to attract those highly qualified candidates throughout the country who do not wish to move to the Washington, D.C.

metropolitan area to take a position in a USIC agency. This advantage has been confirmed by a review of the thousands of applications received thus far from candidates for field office positions. Recent changes to FBI personnel policy also now enable FBI field offices to hire or promote qualified intelligence analysts to the GS-14 non-supervisory pay grade, as has been possible for FBIHQ intelligence analysts.

15. If your competitors for human resources within the U.S. Intelligence Community are requiring graduate degrees for intelligence analysts, will they not be better positioned to attract and retain a higher caliber of analyst?

Response:

No, all new analysts will either have a degree or demonstrated intelligence experience, and many new hires may have both. As discussed further in the previous response, the FBI is in a unique position, in comparison with the rest of the USIC, to attract those highly qualified candidates throughout the country who do not wish to move to the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area to take a position in a USIC agency.

The FBI is seeking ways, through pay flexibilities and other means, to recruit and retain world-class professionals as Intelligence Analysts.

16. A recent FBI intelligence analyst job posting instructed candidates to "...identify the program area of interest...however, this does not guarantee placement in the particular program...." The program areas of interest are counterintelligence (CI), counterterrorism (CT), criminal and cyber. Is the FBI recruiting as intelligence analyst generalists, specialists, or both?

Response:

Our intelligence analyst development program calls for all intelligence analysts joining the FBI to learn the basics of all analytic work roles: operations specialist, reports officer, and all-source analyst. At the intermediate level, analysts will pursue one of three career tracks: 1) continued deliberate extension of general knowledge, 2) deliberate deepening of specific target and work role expertise; and 3) deliberate development of expertise in managing the work of intelligence analysts. This approach allows for the development of target experts, work role experts, and managerial experts, all of which are needed for our analyst program to be successful. Our analysts must be deployed against our nation's intelligence priorities. That requires us to balance the development of experts and the development of utility players who can be deployed against emerging threats. The OI has the responsibility to ensure that the right skill and expertise balance exists in its analytic workforce, and we believe our development program provides

maximum flexibility in reaching and maintaining this balance. Because the analyst development program first teaches the basic tools of intelligence analysis, analysts will be able to apply these tools to new targets quickly and effectively, allowing us to maintain this balance as the threat to our national security evolves.

17. What does the FBI believe the appropriate mix of analytical specialists and generalists may be?

Response:

At FBIHQ, approximately 60% of the intelligence analysts should be specialists and approximately 40% generalists. In the field offices, the mix of specialists and generalists is highly dependent on the threat environment, and the size, staffing, and organizational structure of the particular field office. The need for specialists and generalists varies depending on the functions that each entity within the organization performs. Program managers routinely reassess each organizational/functional area and redirect resources as needed. Recruitment efforts may be adjusted to reflect changes in managers' assessments of program needs and the threat environment.

18. Does the FBI believe that intelligence analysts are interchangeable, that is, that a criminal intelligence analyst working organized crime can perform the same expert analytical function at the same level as a counterterrorism analyst working Al Qaeda?

Response:

No. As discussed further in response to Question 16, the FBI's intelligence analyst development program calls for all intelligence analysts joining the FBI to learn the basics of all analytic work roles (operations specialist, reports officer, and all-source analyst) and to pursue one of three career tracks at the intermediate level (continued deliberate extension of general knowledge, deliberate deepening of specific target and work role expertise; and deliberate development of expertise in managing the work of intelligence analysts). Please see our answer above for additional details concerning our analyst development program.

19. Does the FBI believe that its Special Agents are its best analysts?

Response:

Both Agents and support analysts inherently perform analysis as they work to accomplish the FBI's mission. Agents and analysts routinely work in tandem, each performing functions in the areas for which they are trained and have developed expertise. Analysis is a skill that must be demonstrated by both positions. The investigative work performed by Special Agents inherently

includes analysis of the strength of evidence, the identification of logical investigative leads, and many other activities that require the evaluation of the information collected.

20. How many analysts has the FBI detailed to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)?

Of the 65 FBI personnel allocated to TTIC, most are analysts. The breakout follows.

- 41 Intelligence Analysts
 - 1 Supervisory Technical Information Specialist
- 14 Technical Information Specialists
- 4 Special Agents
- 5 Other Support Personnel

21. What is the division of labor between FBI counterterrorism analysts assigned to TTIC and FBI counterterrorism analysts who remain at FBI Headquarters?

Response:

The FBI's CTD has three core responsibilities: 1) managing CT operations within the United States to detect, disrupt, and prevent terrorist activities; 2) conducting analysis to support its own operations; and 3) producing and disseminating intelligence reports resulting from these operations to all federal CT elements and, as appropriate, state and local law enforcement officials.

FBI analysts within CTD exploit available intelligence and information to drive FBI CT operations that will lead to the identification and disruption of terrorist activities. The FBI is also responsible for analyzing law enforcement and investigative information which has been determined to have no connection to international terrorism (such as information exclusively about neo-Nazi organizations or animal "liberation" groups).

TTIC has the authority to task collection and analysis from USIC agencies, including the FBI. The analytic work conducted at TTIC creates products that inform each of TTIC's partner elements, as well as other federal departments and agencies, as appropriate. These products are developed collaboratively among all of these elements, principally through their assignees physically located at the TTIC facility, but also working closely with their headquarters elements.

22. For how long are analysts detailed to the TTIC?

Response:

Assignments to TTIC are generally two years in length; however, either shorter or longer tours can be negotiated between FBI and the Director of TTIC.

23. Are there any analytical redundancies or planned competitive analyses being conducted by these two groups? If so, please explain the plan to ensure that potentially competing analytical conclusions are briefed to consumers.

Response:

"Competitive analysis" has for decades been a cornerstone of United States intelligence analytic efforts and the best way to guarantee that decision makers get the most accurate possible overall picture. We are still in the process of building a program that will permit this level of analysis.

24. How do FBI counterterrorism analysts assigned to the TTIC interact with counterterrorism professionals within the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) Counterterrorism Center?

Response:

While TTIC has primary responsibility for terrorism threat analysis, the CTC has primary responsibility for all other international terrorism analysis (e.g., terrorism that does not impact on U.S. interests overseas). For example, CTC analysis might focus on terrorist weapons programs, tactics, and logistics capabilities; terrorism financing; and worldwide terrorism cooperation. To the extent these issues require coordination with TTIC, FBI analysts assigned to TTIC will interact with the appropriate CTC analysts.

25. Does the FBI have any analysts assigned to work with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Division?

Response:

There are no FBI intelligence analysts physically assigned to the DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IA/IP) Division. FBI intelligence analysts do, however, coordinate and exchange information with DHS IA/IP analysts daily in terrorism-related matters of mutual interest.

26. With respect to the GS-132 (intelligence analyst) series of employee, what is the FBI's historical (going back 15 years) attrition rates? Are exit interviews conducted with intelligence analysts who depart the FBI? If so, what do the aggregate results of these interviews indicate regarding the reasons FBI analysts depart?

Response:

Specific exit interviews are not conducted with intelligence analysts who depart the FBI. However, exit interviews and questionnaires are provided to all employees separating from the FBI. Some employees provide reasons for their departures; others do not. This information is not required. The table below provides available attrition information for the intelligence analyst position with respect to the past 16 years, with Fiscal Year 2004 figures through 3/24/04.

FBI Intelligence Analyst Statistics

	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	Total
ON-BOARD	103	102	121	129	225	294	363	758	815	948	998	1057	1070	1023	1012	1180	1195	
Hired (EODs)	7	0	3	5	9	21	41	28	39	67	76	54	3	10	40	179	34	616
Hired (movement to 0132 series from another series)	26	11	25	16	111	64	46	412	78	107	106	86	72	36	58	86	44	1384
TOTAL HIRED	33	11	28	21	120	85	87	440	117	174	182	140	75	46	98	265	78	2000

Separated from FBI	8	8	6	6	2	4	4	9	22	22	109	37	36	26	42	67	34	442
Separated from 0132 Series	5	3	4	6	19	8	11	33	14	29	29	33	34	68	61	41	22	420
TOTAL SEPARATED	13	11	10	12	21	12	15	42	36	51	138	70	70	94	103	108	56	862

	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	Total
Total Hired	33	11	28	21	120	85	87	440	117	174	182	140	75	46	98	265	78	2000
Total Separated FBI	8	8	6	6	2	4	4	9	22	22	109	37	36	26	42	67	34	442
Number and % that retired	1 12.5 %	0 0%	0 0%	1 17 %	0 0%	0 0%	2 25 %	1 11 %	2 9%	3 14 %	7 6%	8 22%	4 11%	10 38%	16 38%	15 22%	4 12%	73 16.5%
Number and % that resigned (personal, health, parent, etc.)	4 50%	4 50%	3 50	4 67 %	1 50 %	4 100 %	2 50 %	8 89 %	11 50 %	9 41 %	9 8%	20 54%	14 39%	8 31%	15 36%	18 27%	10 29%	144 32.5%
Number and % that accepted employment elsewhere	3 37.5 %	3 37.5 %	2 33 %	1 16 %	1 50 %	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	8 36 %	10 45 %	89 82 %	3 8%	13 36%	6 23%	10 24%	27 40%	19 56%	195 44%
Number and % removed from FBI	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	1 4%	0 0%	2 2%	3 8%	3 8%	2 8%	1 2%	4 6%	1 3%	17 4%
Number and % that passed away	0 0%	1 12.5 %	1 17 %	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	1 25 %	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	2 2%	3 8%	2 6%	0 0%	0 0%	3 5%	0 0%	13 3%

The information below for the years 2001 to the present depicts the reasons for separation, when available.

2001

46 intelligence analysts were hired in FY 2001; 26 separated from the FBI in FY 2001. Of those 26 employees:

- 10 (38%) Retired
- 6 (23%) Accepted employment with another government agency
- 2 (8%) Removed from the FBI
- 8 (31%) Separated for other reasons (personal, full-time parent, health, etc.)

68 intelligence analysts obtained other positions within the FBI and separated from the 0132 (Intelligence) Series in FY 2001.

2002

98 intelligence analysts were hired in FY 2002; 42 separated from the FBI in FY 2002. Of those 42 employees:

- 16 (38%) Retired
- 10 (24%) Accepted employment with another government agency
- 1 (2%) Removed from the FBI
- 15 (36%) Separated for other reasons (personal, full-time parent, health, etc.)

61 intelligence analysts obtained other positions within the FBI and separated from the 0132 (Intelligence) Series in FY 2002.

2003

265 intelligence analysts were hired in FY 2003; 67 separated from the FBI in FY 2003. Of those 67 employees:

- 15 (22%) Retired
- 27 (40%) Accepted employment with another government agency
- 4 (6%) Removed from the FBI
- 3 (5%) Passed away
- 1 (2%) Accepted into New Agents Class
- 17 (25%) Separated for other reasons (personal, full-time parent, health, etc.)

14 intelligence analysts were migrated to DHS in March of 2003 pursuant to FBI/DHS reorganization.

41 intelligence analysts obtained other positions within the FBI and separated from the 0132 (Intelligence) Series in FY 2003.

10/1/03 - Present (3/24/04)

78 intelligence analysts were hired from 10/1/03 to present; 34 separated from the FBI from 10/1/03 to present. Of those 34 employees:

- 4 (12%) Retired
- 10 (29%) Separated for other reasons (personal, full-time parent, health, etc.)
- 19 (56%) Accepted employment with another government agency
- 1 (3%) Removed from the FBI

22 intelligence analysts have obtained other positions within the FBI and have separated from the 0132 (Intelligence) Series from 10/1/03 to present.

27. What percentage of FBI intelligence assets (operational assets, etc.) are vetted analytically? What role do FBI intelligence analysts and Special Agents play in the asset vetting process? Who makes the final judgment on the credibility and reliability of an intelligence asset? How are differences (regarding source reliability and credibility) between case agents who recruited a source and intelligence analysts who assess information reported from a source resolved?

Response:

Currently human source validation processes vary among the major investigative programs. For example, CI program assets undergo a formal validation process modeled largely on the [REDACTED] Criminal informants and cooperating witnesses are subjected to suitability and reliability assessments pursuant to Resolution 18 of the Attorney General Guidelines (to include review by the Criminal Informant Review Committee).

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We are now formulating a standard set of processes and procedures across FBI programs for human source validation and vetting. It will build on best practices in our four investigative programs and establish a single set of standards and protocols for all FBI programs. The administration of that process will be transferred to the OI for execution and monitoring once the standards and protocols are complete. The Office of Inspections is leading the FBI-wide effort to formulate the asset vetting and validation standards and protocols.

28. With respect to the Trilogy Project, are analysts now able to text search (with appropriate security controls) all communications into FBI Headquarters from FBI field offices and the U.S. Intelligence Community?

Response:

Analysts can conduct text searches currently using the Automated Case Support (ACS) system, but the process is cumbersome. The Virtual Case File (VCF) technology will enhance analysts' ability to search both structured (fielded/tagged) and unstructured (free text) data with appropriate access controls.

29. Has FBI Headquarters conducted inspections of its field offices to determine if they are uploading investigative/operational communications in a timely and accurate manner for analytical exploitation? If so, what are the results of those inspections, with respect to this issue?

Response:

The Inspection Division conducted comprehensive reviews of the operations of twenty field divisions over the past year. These reviews did not identify significant deficiencies with respect to the entry of investigative information into the FBI's system of records. Deficiencies were noted with respect to failures to timely record accomplishments for statistical purposes.

Routine file reviews by field office supervisory personnel are another way of determining whether standard records management procedures are being followed by individual agents and analysts.

The Information Resources Division provides the Records Management Division (RMD) with a statistical chart which indicates the number of documents added to ACS and the number of these documents whose text has also been uploaded. Most offices are uploading between 80 and 100 percent of the document types that are capable of being uploaded. This chart is provided to the field so that field managers can monitor their performance in addition to reiterating the importance of uploading documents into ACS. While this report only tracks those documents which have been added to ACS as serials, and does not track documents which remain on FBI employees' computers, on disks, and in desk drawers, RMD is currently working on a new Records Policy Manual which, when completed, will be issued and available to all employees. This manual will reiterate the importance of managing materials on individual computer drives and otherwise under individual employee control, and of uploading these materials into the Bureau's systems of records.

INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION AND THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

1. In instances in which the U.S. Intelligence Community develops information indicating a terrorist threat to U.S. infrastructure, how is that information shared with the FBI? What is the division of labor between the FBI and DHS with respect to notification of State and local law enforcement and private sector owners of U.S. critical national infrastructure?

USIC terrorist threat information is shared with the FBI in a variety of ways: jointly staffed offices and projects, electronically transmitted and hard copy intelligence reports and other products, and personal contact between intelligence counterparts.

The FBI has responsibility for communicating terrorism information to state and local law enforcement organizations by using NLETS or by communicating through the NJTTF to local JTTFs. DHS is responsible for communicating terrorism information to all state and local officials and appropriate private sector organizations outside the law enforcement domain. The FBI and DHS issue joint threat warnings.

2. How does the interaction between the FBI and DHS take place with respect to such information?

Response:

Interaction between the FBI and DHS takes place on a number of levels. DHS representatives attend the FBI's Daily Intelligence Production Board meetings; DHS members are part of the NJTTF at FBIHQ; intelligence components at FBIHQ are in daily contact with DHS intelligence components to coordinate intelligence reporting and analysis; and DHS component organizations have substantial representation in the JTTFs in the field.

Multiple vehicles have been developed specifically to convey threat information between the FBI and DHS.

The Emergent Threat Intelligence/Information System: The Emergent Threat Intelligence/Information system was developed primarily as a means of communication between the DHS Homeland Security Operations Center and the FBI's CT Watch in our SIOC. This interface occurs via several secure mediums, including telephone, facsimile transmission, and Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) or Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) computer transmission. It is anticipated that future communication will be processed (as allowed) via the JRIES (law enforcement sensitive) computer system. Examples of the types of intelligence requests made through this system include name checks of persons of interest on incoming flights, major developments in ongoing operations or investigations, and short notice write-ins or bomb threats. A communication is deemed "emergent threat" when the request is time sensitive and a routine or formal method of interagency notification would delay the transmission of potentially critical information.

"Request for Information" Cable Transmissions: This type of intelligence or information request has been established to address specific ongoing or long-term intelligence or information requests. Utilizing this medium, DHS submits a detailed request for specific information to the FBI CTD's Executive Staff at FBIHQ. After the information is properly vetted for case sensitive content, a response is provided to DHS via the same cable transmission medium.

Routine Intelligence or Information: Routine intelligence or information is disseminated to DHS, the USIC, the law enforcement community, and ultimately the private sector via intelligence bulletins that are issued weekly and as necessary. The FBI currently is working with DHS to provide a unified dissemination system to prevent conflicting or duplicative messages. An example of this joint effort is FBIHQ's Terrorism Watch and Warning Unit, which provides a draft of the Weekly Intelligence Bulletin to DHS for input prior to publication.

3. How many State and local law enforcement officers have been granted Secret or Top Secret security clearances?

Response:

Between September 11, 2001 and February 19, 2004, the Security Division received and processed the following:

State and Local Law Enforcement Executives:

- 2,707 security clearance requests received
- 2,351 successfully processed
- 269 open cases currently pending

Joint Terrorism Task Force Members:

- 1,589 requests for Top Secret Clearance
- 1,414 successfully processed
- 175 open cases currently pending

4. What information thresholds and procedures do FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) use when considering whether intelligence should be shared with State and local law enforcement officials, as well as with private sector Information Sharing and Analytical Centers (ISACs)? Do any written guidelines outlining the thresholds and procedures for dissemination of (sensitive but unclassified and classified) intelligence to state and local law enforcement exist?

Response:

In March 2004, FBIHQ issued written procedural guidance to all field offices regarding intelligence reporting and dissemination with respect to JTTFs. This guidance specifically addressed the relationship between the FIG and the JTTF in each field office.

The FIG will deploy to the JTTF a combination of the following personnel depending on the structures of the organizations involved: one or more intelligence analysts in a Reports Officer role, one or more Special Agents, and/or a cleared, permanent FIG task force officer or analyst with a dedicated assignment of reporting raw, collected intelligence which meets specified reporting thresholds. This information is communicated to CTD's TRRS for dissemination to FBI intelligence customers by CTD via an Intelligence Information Report (IIR). FBIHQ intelligence analysts communicate and coordinate daily with DHS. DHS, whose component agencies participate in the JTTF and/or FIG, is responsible for communicating terrorism information to all state and local officials and appropriate private sector organizations outside the law enforcement domain.

The FBI has drafted an Intelligence Dissemination Policy Manual, which has been provided to the Department of Justice for review. The draft manual addresses comprehensive intelligence dissemination policy issues, such as dissemination of classified and unclassified intelligence to a broad range of customers, including state, local, and tribal law enforcement officials.

The FBI is also in the final stages of preparing an Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management Handbook which addresses reporting thresholds for state, local, and tribal law enforcement dissemination.

5. Has the FBI conducted consumer surveys with State and local law enforcement personnel to determine their satisfaction with the FBI's dissemination? If so, what are the results?

Response:

The FBI is currently constructing a web-based customer survey for state and local law enforcement agencies to learn of their satisfaction level with information and intelligence disseminated by the FBI. This survey has not yet been distributed, but is expected to be in the near future. This feedback report will be part of future field office pre-inspections to determine satisfaction levels.

OLEC reports that, during its two-year existence, the number of complaint calls from law enforcement personnel regarding information sharing by the FBI has steadily decreased. When OLEC personnel attend meetings with law enforcement, they are often told that there is an increase in cooperation and information sharing by the FBI. The Director's Law Enforcement Advisory Group also reports that its members have experienced a significant improvement in the level of cooperation and information sharing between the FBI and state and local law enforcement.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

The Committee recognizes that the FBI has made substantial organizational changes as it reforms its approach to intelligence, to include the establishment of an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence, an OI, Field Intelligence Groups, and an Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, among others.

1. The FBI has established Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) at each of its 56 field offices. Who controls these resources on a daily basis, the local Special Agent in-Charge, the FBI Headquarters Office of Intelligence, or the Executive Assistant Director-Intelligence? Generally, who are the rating and reviewing officials for professionals serving in the FIG?

Response:

The Special Agent in Charge (SAC) or, in the case of the New York, Washington, and Los Angeles Field Offices, the Assistant Director in Charge (ADIC), is ultimately responsible for the daily operation of the FIGs.

Those assigned to the FIGs coordinate, manage, and perform intelligence functions. Accordingly, they receive performance-related oversight and direction from the FIG chain of command. Special Agents assigned to the FIG are rated by the FIG Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) and reviewed by the Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) for Intelligence. Analysts are rated by the FIG Supervisory Intelligence Analyst (SIA) and reviewed by the FIG SSA. If a field office does not have an SIA, the SSA becomes the rating official for that office's analysts and the ASAC would then assume the role of the reviewing official.

2. How many FIGs have reports officers currently on board?

Response:

As of 5/18/04, 49 of the FIGs have reports officers on board. There are currently 56 active reports officers on board across these 49 field offices. The FBI has a funded staffing level of 81 reports officers for FBI field offices, and the selection and background investigation process to fill the 25 unencumbered positions is in progress. In the field offices in which no reports officer is currently assigned, FBI analysts are performing the reports officer function and will continue to do so until reports officers are brought on board.

3. How many reports officers are on board across the FBI (please include a breakdown by field office and Headquarters)?

Response:

There are 44 reports officers assigned to FBIHQ; 24 in CTD, 9 in OI, and 11 in the Counterintelligence Division. Currently 56 reports officers are on board in field offices.

4. Do the FIGs have access to national intelligence, or only that which is collected locally by the FBI? What is the relationship between FIGs and analysts at FBI Headquarters?

Response:

Yes, FIGs have access to national intelligence in a variety of ways, including liaison with members of the USIC, established networks with the FBI's state,

local, and tribal partners, and through established communication and reporting of national intelligence matters to and from FBIHQ.

The FIG is the centralized intelligence component in each field office responsible for the management, execution, and coordination of the intelligence function. As part of that function, FIGs routinely communicate with analysts and other intelligence personnel at FBIHQ to exchange pertinent intelligence, to report raw intelligence information, and to share other information deemed of national or regional significance. In addition, FIGs report intelligence to FBIHQ analysts and other intelligence personnel for dissemination outside of the FBI, including dissemination to members of the USIC and of the state, local, and tribal police communities.

5. What is the relationship between FIGs and other locally stationed representatives of the U.S. Intelligence Community?

Response:

Locally stationed representatives of the USIC operate under the auspices of the FIG in their interactions with local FBI field offices. In general, the FIG serves as the centralized intelligence component that coordinates intelligence functions and information sharing with representatives of the USIC.

6. FBI publications indicate that these FIGs are structured differently based on the size of the field office. Is the size or type of field office positively correlated with the foreign intelligence or terrorist threat to the United States?

Response:

The size of a field office is based on current and emerging national security threats, criminal threats, and demographic and geographic factors. Similarly, the size of each FIG is based on these same factors within the particular field office structure.

7. How are these FIGs being utilized?

Response:

The FIG is used to centrally manage the FBI's intelligence functions in the field office and is responsible for the management, execution, and coordination of intelligence cycle functions (requirements; planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and production; and dissemination).

8. How many FIGs are managed by analytical personnel?

Response:

The FIGs in the following four FBI field offices are managed by analytical personnel (namely SIAs): Charlotte, Cleveland, Denver, and Portland.

9. Do the FIGs report directly to the Special Agent-in-Charge or the Assistant Director-in-Charge?

Response:

In most field offices, the FIG is directly supervised by an SSA who reports to the ASAC of the Intelligence Program. However, there are a few exceptions. In some of the FBI's larger field offices, the FIG is comprised of several squads. For example, in the New York Field Office the FIG consists of five squads. Each of the five squad supervisors reports directly to the ASAC for Intelligence, who is subordinate to the SAC for CT. In the Los Angeles and Houston Field Offices, executive management created a GS-15 Program Manager position to directly supervise intelligence operations. These Program Managers report directly to their respective SACs.

10. Has the FBI conducted any assessments of whether the FIGs are producing intelligence results better than old organizational scheme, in which analysts were integrated with investigative/operational squads?

Response:

The FIGs provide an independent intelligence requirements and collection function; supervise and oversee effective standards for the intelligence analyst workforce; and provide planning and direction to all other parts of the intelligence cycle. Under the FIG concept, intelligence analysts continue to be integrated, or interactive, with all squads, Resident Agencies, and Task Forces as necessary to fulfill the intelligence analysis responsibilities articulated in the FBI's Intelligence CONOPS.

Several assessments are underway to evaluate intelligence performance in the field offices. Additionally, field office inspections now focus specifically on intelligence performance.

11. Will all newly recruited analysts (hired as a result of the ongoing initiative to hire 900 analysts) allocated to the field be assigned to the FIGs? If so, does each of the FIGs have a plan of action as to how it will absorb, train, and deploy the analysts? Have these FIG plans been coordinated with the Headquarters Office of Intelligence?

Response:

Not all new intelligence analyst positions will be allocated to field offices. All intelligence analysts who are assigned to the field will be administratively assigned to a FIG for performance oversight and management.

New field office inspection standards include a review of the field office's plans for the assessment and development of its intelligence analyst complement. The OI worked with the Inspection Division to develop the inspection standards. The FIGs have been supplied with various CONOPS and other guidance to assist them in assigning, deploying, and providing training opportunities for intelligence analysts.

12. The FBI plans to collocate elements of the Counterterrorism Division with the interagency Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the DCI's Counterterrorism Center. Presumably this move is being made to integrate more closely U.S. counterterrorism activities. Is this a merger of equals? How will law enforcement equities be protected?

Response:

CTD, TTIC, and CTC are not merging. The FBI is collocating a portion of CTD in the building occupied by TTIC, but these CTD elements will retain their identities, including their separate chain of command and reporting structures. CTC will also relocate a portion of its organization to the same building. The collocation will not adversely affect law enforcement equities, but is instead intended to improve operational coordination, enhance interaction, facilitate information sharing, and create a synergy among U.S. officials engaged in the war against terrorism.

13. Precisely how will information and cases be managed so as to prevent, consistent with current U.S. law and regulation, foreign intelligence entities from investigating or surveilling U.S. citizens domestically?

Response:

The FBI CTD is not merging with the other agencies, but will collocate with them to improve operational cooperation. This collocation will not result in the creation of a new organization and the FBI will continue to conduct its activities in accordance with all applicable legal guidelines and internal authorities.

Numerous authorities impact the Bureau's investigative process and govern how the FBI manages information and cases. These include the USA PATRIOT Act, the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign CI Investigations, and FISA. These

authorities will remain in place after the collocation of the FBI's CTD, the TTIC, and the DCI's CTC.

These authorities and longstanding requirements with respect to the safeguarding of sensitive and classified information (including Executive Orders 12958, 12968, and 13292) and the conduct of CI activities (including Executive Order 12333) will ensure that improved coordination within the USIC does not have the adverse affect of increasing the ability of foreign intelligence entities to harm the interests of the United States or its citizens.

14. Will the FBI retain its own cadre of intelligence analysts, or will they all be incorporated into another analytical entity within the new organization?

Response:

Yes, the FBI will retain its own cadre of intelligence analysts. The collocation of three separate entities (TTIC, the DCI's CTC, and portions of the FBI's CTD) will not create a new entity. Not all parts of CTD will be relocating to the new building, and those elements that are relocating will retain their distinctive operational responsibilities and authorities and will continue to report through their respective chains of command. As indicated above, the FBI's CTD has now, and will continue to have following the partial relocation, three core responsibilities: 1) managing CT operations within the United States to detect, disrupt, and prevent terrorist activities; 2) conducting analysis to support its own operations; and 3) producing and disseminating to all federal CT elements and, as appropriate, to state and local law enforcement officials, intelligence reports resulting from these operations. Therefore, intelligence analysts will continue to be a critical element in CTD's organizational structure and operational capability, and they will continue to support all three core CTD responsibilities.

15. Will such an organizational construct affect in any way the support the FBI's Counter-terrorism Division provides to FBI field offices?

Response:

No. As mentioned previously, the collocation of the U.S. Government's primary CT entities in one building is not creating a new agency or organizational construct. Relocation of a portion of the FBI's CTD will have no effect on FBIHQ's relationship with the 56 FBI field offices with respect to the support provided, the dissemination of intelligence, the coordination of cases, or other operational matters.

BUSINESS PROCESS CHANGES

1. In testimony before the Congress, the Director stated that the FBI has centralized management of counterterrorism and counterintelligence programs. Presumably, FBI Headquarters has long exercised managerial control over cases opened, for the most part, out of the FBI's 56 field offices (the Office of Origin concept). Specifically, how has the new centralization initiative changed Headquarters oversight, influence over, and interest in counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases and operations? Does the Office of Origin concept remain in place?

Response:

The centralization of the FBI's national security programs applies more to program management than to individual case management. As discussed further below, oversight of individual cases by FBIHQ has been and is still generally reserved for complex investigations that rely on multiple FBI Divisions or multiple agencies, utilize sophisticated investigative techniques (requiring high level authorities), are highly sensitive or high profile, or require FISA authority or a Title III court order. Centralization at the program level, rather than at the case level, has increased significantly because of the benefits inherent in such centralization. For example, a centrally controlled and managed CI program ensures:

1. The commitment of adequate resources to support an effective national CI program and accountability among field managers;
2. A shift in emphasis from criminal and reactive to national security and proactive.
3. The pursuit of espionage prosecution when warranted and the use of other lawful neutralization techniques when espionage prosecution is not possible.
4. A reinvigorated asset recruitment and validation program.
5. A dynamic analytical process to assess and rank both foreign intelligence threats and national CI priorities.
6. Full access to the authorities necessary for many of the investigative and operational techniques used in CI cases, including FBIHQ managers, the FBI Director, the Attorney General, and the DCI, all of whom are located in the Washington, D.C. area. Unlike criminal cases, which typically rely on investigative authorities available to field offices because they are exercised by SACs, United States Attorneys, and the local federal

judiciary, in CI cases these authorities have only moderate authority. For example, the FISA requires that FISA matters be handled exclusively through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court located in Washington, D.C.

7. The FBI's ability to respond appropriately to an adversary that is very different from a traditional criminal defendant. For example, in CI matters the adversary may be a foreign intelligence service that has a centrally controlled bureaucracy with a strategy, plans, and budget, or it may be an intelligence service that operates asymmetrically from amorphous collection platforms as well as through more traditional symmetrical means. Defeating and disrupting an organization like the latter requires a comprehensive strategy and program plan. Success would likely not result from a piece-meal approach, but would be possible based on an approach that incorporates robust centrally driven strategic analysis as well as local tactical analysis.

With respect specifically to individual case management, the Office of Origin concept remains in place for CT investigations. The FBI has traditionally allowed SACs great latitude in all facets of investigative strategy and categories, and SACs and their field agents still exercise overall operational and day-to-day control of the vast majority of individual cases.

As indicated above, increased FBI oversight and centralization of individual cases is somewhat more frequent now than in the past because more FBI investigative assets are focused on CT and these cases more frequently involve multiple FBI Divisions and multiple agencies. Because individual offices may have a narrower view of the FBI's overall CT program and a limited ability to interface daily with the multitude of foreign and domestic organizations often involved in CT investigations, increased centralization allows FBIHQ to set, monitor, and adjust national priorities and to coordinate information analysis and intelligence sharing.

In rare situations, FBIHQ exercises operational control of an investigation counter to the desires of an SAC. In most cases this is because the overall strategic objective is different from the field division's objective. Operational determinations such as this are normally discussed at length before implementation.

2. How, if at all, has this centralization initiative shifted the relative balance of power between FBI Headquarters and Field Special Agents in-Charge?

Response:

The nationally managed and centrally driven CT and CI programs offer the benefit of consistent and focused guidance and direction. SACs do, though, still retain control of their investigative assets, and any balance of power shift between FBIHQ and the field SACs required by a complex or multi-agency case is usually understood as appropriate and beneficial for the overall effectiveness of the Bureau. For example, while the Assistant Director for CI clearly sets program parameters through the development of the CI strategy and program plans, SACs continue to exercise control over field office operations and SACs generally welcome CI program guidance and direction.

3. Consistent with legislative initiatives codified in the USA PATRIOT Act, the FBI has outlined a new investigative strategy for terrorism cases known as the Model Counter-terrorism Investigative Strategy (MCIS). How exactly are criminal and national security cases integrated pursuant to this new strategy? How is this strategy being implemented at FBI Headquarters and in the field?

Response:

In the past, investigators would have focused solely on either intelligence collection or criminal prosecution. Recognizing that the long-term goal of an international terrorism investigation is the development of intelligence regarding all aspects of the terrorist threat, the MCIS empowers field offices to utilize a variety of means, ranging from non-criminal measures to prosecution, to resolve a threat, but emphasizes the need to conduct intelligence investigations in order to fully identify the nature and extent of the threat, its perpetrators, and linkages to terrorist groups. However, because of their nature, international terrorism investigations are nationally managed by CTD under the MCIS to ensure that field offices coordinate with the appropriate CTD operational, analytical, reports dissemination, and operational support units during the course of each stage of an investigation.

4. Does this strategy incorporate domestic terrorism and international terrorism cases?

Response:

The MCIS applies only to International Terrorism investigations. Consequently, it does not address domestic terrorism investigations, which are conducted pursuant to the Attorney General Guidelines on General Crimes.

ENABLING CHANGES

1. Historically, there has been little in the way of formal career paths and development for both Special Agents and intelligence analysts who wished to spend their entire career working in the FBI's counterterrorism and counterintelligence programs. What specific measures have been put into place to establish formal intelligence career paths for Special Agents and intelligence analysts?

Response:

Analyst Career Tracks: The FBI has instituted an analyst career track that offers three different analyst career paths. After analysts reach a certain level of seniority (the GS-11 level), they are asked if they are interested in: (1) building expertise in a specific program area (such as al Qaeda); (2) gaining broader expertise that will prepare them to work in a broader number of program areas; or (3) working toward becoming a supervisor or manager in the Intelligence Program. Training and temporary assignments appropriate to a particular track are first offered to analysts in that track.

Special Agent Career Tracks: Traditionally, the Bureau has recruited, trained, rewarded, and promoted its agents for law enforcement work. This approach was adequate so long as the Bureau's mission was perceived primarily as law enforcement. Now that intelligence work has assumed a central role in the FBI's efforts to prevent terrorism, this approach is no longer adequate. Consequently, in March 2004 the FBI established a new career path for Special Agents designed with three objectives. First, the career path will give all FBI Agents experience with intelligence and analysis. Second, the career path will provide an opportunity to develop specialized skills, experience, and aptitudes in one of four priority areas: (1) intelligence; (2) CT/CI; (3) cyber; or (4) criminal. Third, it will make intelligence expertise and experience prerequisites for elevation to senior supervisory ranks. This plan will produce a cadre of Special Agents who are proficient in the processes of intelligence collection, but who also have the law enforcement skills and knowledge necessary to take advantage of our integrated operational approach.

2. How many intelligence analytical personnel serve in the Senior Executive Service at the FBI?

Response:

The FBI has three Senior Executive Service positions classified in the 0132 series. We are developing formal mechanisms to prepare analytic personnel for entry into senior positions and working to create additional executive positions, both management and technical, to lead the FBI's Intelligence program.

3. How many intelligence analysts are employed as non-managerial GS-15 personnel?

Response:

The FBI has many 0132 personnel at the GS-15 level, but they are currently all in managerial positions. The FBI is exploring mechanisms to establish non-supervisory GS-15 analyst positions.

4. Can Special Agents in field offices be unwillingly reassigned from national security to criminal work at the behest of the local Special Agent-in-Charge?

Response:

FBI Special Agents in Field Offices are assigned based on the FBI's priorities, the threat environment in the Field Office's territory, and the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the Special Agents available. SACs have the latitude to make assignments in the Field Office according to the needs of the FBI.

5. Are Career Boards now structured in such a manner (having clearances and a "need to know") that allow them to review fully a Special Agent's of intelligence analyst's work products for promotion consideration?

Response:

New promotion procedures were established for all FBI 0132 Intelligence Analysts in December 2003. These procedures establish promotion boards to review an analyst's work products and demonstrated skills to determine if a promotion is merited.

All career board members have the necessary clearances to review an employee's work product. The established procedures include a provision to allow promotion assessment by a different means if an employee's work products are extremely sensitive and review by promotion board members would be inappropriate.

The Special Agent career boards are able to review all necessary information in considering promotions.

6. Specifically, what new training initiatives have been implemented and are in place that enhance new and experienced FBI employee training on intelligence matters?

Response:

Please see the response to question 12 in the "Analysis and Intelligence Cycle" section.

7. Do Special Agents train jointly with [REDACTED] regarding intelligence asset recruitment methodologies? If not, why?

Response:

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FBI Special Agents do not train jointly with [REDACTED] Intelligence Officers regarding intelligence asset methodologies because of the difference in the two agencies' missions: the FBI mission incorporates law enforcement, whereas the [REDACTED] focuses only on intelligence. The FBI is working with our partners in the USIC to develop a training curriculum that focuses on the skills and knowledge needed by the FBI's Special Agents in this area.

8. How and to what extent has the FBI's College of Analytic Studies drawn on the experiences of other U.S. Intelligence Community analytical training groups, such as the [REDACTED] and the Joint Military Intelligence College?

Response:

As a result of the funding appropriated by Congress specifically to support FBI Intelligence Analysis Training, a number of fundamental intelligence analysis training modules that are now used within the USIC will be adopted for use in FBI analyst training. The FBI's strategy includes the use of experienced contractors to help identify relevant courses, subject matter experts to provide training, and a "train the trainer" approach to help build a cadre of effective intelligence analysis instructors within the FBI.

The CAS has drawn primarily on the expertise of three USIC training and development organizations as it revises and enhances its analytic training.

Sherman Kent School: College representatives initiated meetings with Instructors from the Sherman Kent School (SKS) in the Spring of 2002. After numerous meetings and discussions, instructors from the SKS developed two weeks of training for inclusion in the FBI's six-week BIA course. Further, under the auspices of the College, numerous SKS courses were delivered to FBI analysts both at the Agency's facility in Lake Fairfax, Virginia, and throughout various FBI field offices. The College continues a close working relationship with the SKS and is in the process of initiating contract procedures to obtain the services of various contractors originally hired by the SKS to deliver similar training to FBI analysts.

Defense Intelligence Agency: College representatives enjoy a productive working relationship with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). A comprehensive practical exercise, originally created by DIA, is included in the College's six-week

BIA course. In fact, DIA instructors are often used to evaluate FBI analysts' presentations at the conclusion of the DIA exercise.

Joint Military Intelligence College: Representatives from the College met extensively with staff from the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) during the Spring and Summer of 2002 and examined JMIC's curriculum to determine how it could be incorporated into FBI analyst training. Both parties agreed that the best vehicle for taking advantage of the JMIC's expertise would be the establishment of a "scholarship" program whereby the FBI would send analysts to JMIC to obtain a Master of Science degree in Strategic Analysis. The FBI initiated such a program during FY 2003.

9. By what performance criteria is the FBI assessing the outcomes of its new training initiatives? Have any studies been conducted? If so, what are the results?

Response:

As indicated in earlier responses, intelligence analysts' basic and advanced training courses are being revised and improved. In the current basic intelligence training module, students are afforded an opportunity to complete Level 1 evaluations, i.e., how they reacted to the instruction. The evaluation results have revealed consistent student satisfaction with the training they received.

Level 2 evaluations, i.e., learning impact as a result of the training, are primarily conducted via the practical application of learning through class exercises. Students participate in numerous group exercises which provide them with opportunities to apply the knowledge they have gained to real world situations. This level of evaluation is also being expanded during FY 2004 to include a comprehensive final exam at the conclusion of the six-week BIA course.

The College has not had an opportunity to apply evaluations at Level 3 (behavior) or Level 4 (return to FBI) because of the evolution of intelligence analysis processes within the FBI itself. However, the College anticipates being able to implement these two levels of evaluation in FY 2005 with the benefit of OI's CONOPS and supporting policies and procedures and the development of the expanded basic analyst course (ACES I).

10. The FBI continues to update its information technology in support of its mission. Numerous General Accounting Office and Department of Justice - Office of Inspector General studies have critiqued the lack of an overall enterprise architecture for the changes currently being made. Has the FBI developed an enterprise architecture for integrating the many ongoing information technology improvement projects in which it is engaged?

Response:

The FBI realizes the importance of an Enterprise Architecture (EA), and therefore has established a formal EA program. The FBI is aware of the criticisms made by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the DOJ Inspector General, and agrees that appropriate corrective actions must be expedited. An EA policy statement that provides guidance and direction for the EA program was approved in September 2003 and is being implemented. In addition, an FBI Enterprise Architecture Board (EAB) has been formally established, with representation across the Bureau, to evaluate architecturally significant projects in order to ensure compliance with standards and the information technology (IT) operating environment. Architectural reviews have become an integral part of the IT investment management process, and FBI procedures now require that all projects with a lifetime budget of over \$10 million be approved through the board and signed by the Chief Information Officer (CIO).

An IT Strategic Plan provides guidance for the EA staff's development of a "To Be" architecture that enhances the FBI's IT support. The CIO has initiated the development of a formal EA Staff to address: business/mission, application, information, infrastructure, and security. On March 19, 2004, the FBI awarded a contract for products that will achieve EA compliance with GAO's "management maturity level three" in FY2004 and with "maturity level four" in FY2005. The CIO is additionally developing policy that will require solution architects to be part of the team responsible for the design and development of FBI systems.

11. When will the Trilogy's Virtual Case File (VCF) system be operational?

Response:

The Computer Sciences Corporation completed the replacement of FBI computer hardware on 4/28/04. The final phase of Trilogy is upgrading of the FBI's case management software by converting from the ACS system to the VCF format. The FBI is currently working with the Science Applications International Corporation to determine what needs to be adjusted to meet the Director's completion deadline of the end of 2004.

12. When the VCF is operational, will investigative/operational squads (consistent with appropriate security procedures) in the field be able to restrict an analyst's access to documents developed as a result of ongoing investigation and operation?

Response:

Access controls on VCF-created investigative records are a component of the security model being implemented. These access controls are defined both by the

user's role and the document level or type (such as grand jury material). Legal restrictions on access and restrictions imposed by policy will be no greater than necessary to protect investigative integrity and will be developed with a sensitivity to the importance of full information in an analyst's efforts to "connect the dots."

13. What is the status of the FBI's electronic connectivity to the rest of the U.S. Intelligence Community? What information technology initiatives have been implemented to ensure more timely sharing of intelligence between the FBI and other entities of the U.S. Intelligence Community?

Response:

The FBI is connected to the rest of the USIC at the Top Secret SCI level via the new SCI Operational Network (SCION). The SCION project was initiated in September, 2001, and has met all schedule, budget, and performance requirements. SCION connects to the USIC (Intelink) via the Metropolitan Area Network and JWICS. SCION is the business tool for the FBI's OI, CT, and CI Divisions and has enabled FBIHQ CT and CI personnel to perform their duties more efficiently and effectively. For example, the FBI uses SCION to contribute to the President's Terrorist Threat Reports and IIRs.

SCION is currently available to over 1000 users at FBIHQ, and the FBI has initiated a pilot deployment project in the New York, Boston, and Kansas City field offices. As funding becomes available, SCION will be made available to all FBI field offices. Limited access to Intelink is available in most field offices through the FBI's Intelligence Information System Network (IISNET), though this access is accomplished through older and often inadequate workstations located in small Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) that are not accessible to all Special Agents or analysts. An impediment to field expansion of Intelink is the lack of SCIF space for FIG and JTTF personnel.

Access to the intelligence and homeland security communities at the Secret level is provided via the Department of Defense SIPRNET, which provides the communications backbone to INTELINK-Secret. The FBI has established a small SIPRNET presence, but requirements for this access are increasing dramatically, including the need for INTELINK-Secret access at each JTTF, FIG, and Regional Counterintelligence Working Group for each assigned Special Agent and analyst. The FBI's goal is to provide SIPRNET/INTELINK-Secret access through secure dynamic virtual private networks to all FBI workstations in the future. The Anti-Drug Network rides the SIPRNET communications backbone and provides terminals and access as a vehicle for the domestic exchange of intelligence on anti-drug efforts.

For the transmission of official information to other agencies, the FBI has just implemented its new FBI Automated Messaging System (FAMS), which is based on the Defense Messaging System (DMS) and will provide writer-to-reader secure e-mail to both internal and external users. The FBI is the first civilian agency to operate the classified DMS. FAMS will permit on-line message creation, review, and search capabilities to everyone connected to FBINET. FAMS gives the FBI the capability of sending and receiving to any of the 40,000+ DMS and AUTODIN addresses. A TS/SCI version of FAMS is currently being tested and will provide the same capability to everyone on SCION or IISNET. Within the government, DMS will replace AUTODIN and a diverse array of e-mail systems currently in use throughout the Department of Defense and the USIC. In its final form, DMS will become the government's global secure e-mail system, providing certified interoperability for over 2 million civilian and military users and permitting multi-media attachments to messages and provide end-to-end security.

The FBI is just beginning to implement data mart programs as part of the Intelligence Community System for Information Sharing (ICSIS), and the first FBI TS/SCI IC Data Mart (ICDM) is currently in development. The FBI will apply new security technology to deploy a Protection Level 3 Data Mart capability with discretionary access controls and Public Key Infrastructure certificates in support of closed Communities of Interest, which will permit secure sharing of our most sensitive data with trusted members of other agencies. Current FBI intelligence products (intelligence bulletins and raw IIRs) are being published on FBI web sites connected to SIPRNET and JWICS. The FBI does not yet publish metadata with these products, but we are in the process of meeting this requirement. The FBI is also working with DOJ on interfaces between ICSIS and the Law Enforcement Information Sharing initiative, and with the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services Division to increase the sharing of intelligence related information with state and local officials.

The FBI is also investigating the use of secure one-way transfers to move information between security domains and to permit all-source intelligence analysis, and the use of next-generation, community High Assurance Guards is being planned to provide for the two-way transfer on critical intelligence between security domains. Secure wireless connectivity and Virtual Private Networks are also being considered to improve access to intelligence by deployed personnel. The FBI is also starting to use on-line, desktop collaboration tools such as Info Work Space, which is the foundation for the Intelligence Community Collaboration Portal to increase intelligence collaboration.

DATE: 01-25-2007

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REASON: 1.4.(c)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 04/02/2003

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS, CONUS 1, Team 4

SSA [REDACTED]

IOS [REDACTED]

General Counsel

Chief, NSLU

From: Los Angeles

CT-5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

DATE: 01-25-2007

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REASON: 1.4 (c)

DECLASSIFY ON: 01-25-2032

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

Title: ~~(S)~~ ABDULAZIZ Y.A.Y.H. ALROOMI;
ABDULAZIZ AL-ROOMI;
IT-UBL/AL-QAEDA;

Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED]

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Derived From : G-3

Declassify On: X1

(U) Full Field Investigation Instituted: 11/18/2002 (NON-USPER)

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Enclosure(s): ~~(S)~~ Enclosed is a [REDACTED]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 04/02/2003

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To: Counterterrorism \ From: Los Angeles
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 04/02/2003

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To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 04/02/2003

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To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 04/02/2003

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REQ 2-1j

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~~SECRET~~//NOFORN/ORCON

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To: Counterterrorism From: Los Angeles
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 04/02/2003

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~~SECRET~~//NOFORN/ORCON

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To: Counterterrorism \ From: Los Angeles
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 04/02/2003

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1 : (Action)
COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) ~~(S)~~ FBIHQ is requested to disseminate enclosed
information to the National Security Law Unit and subsequent
(S) units related to [REDACTED]

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) ~~(S)~~ For SSA [REDACTED] Review investigation
(S) for preparation of [REDACTED]

♦♦

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN/ORCON

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/07/2002

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] place of birth Tunis, Tunisia, address [redacted] CA, telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at the INS detention facility located at 300 N. Los Angeles St., Los Angeles, CA. Present during the interview was Los Angeles Police Officer [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] was born and raised in Tunis, Tunisia. He first came to the United States on 01/25/1999 on a visitors Visa. He arrived with his mother who stayed for approximately two weeks and then left back home to Tunisia. Shortly after he arrived in Los Angeles he enrolled in a English language school called Concord English Language. After studying there for ten month he began taking computer science classes at West Los Angeles College.

[redacted] goal is to complete his education in the United States, save some money, and then return to Tunisia. [redacted] he is currently being sponsored by a Saudi Arabia named [redacted] LNU in his attempts to obtain a green card. [redacted] is approximately forty-years old and owns a computer/internet company. [redacted]

[redacted] He began sponsoring [redacted] in April 2001.

Prior to living at his current address he lived at [redacted] in Los Angeles. He lived with [redacted] from Sudan. [redacted] is approximately [redacted] years old, dark complexion, [redacted] is currently still living on Leeward, however he is still in Saudia Arabia following the Haj. [redacted] attends the King Fahad Mosque.

[redacted] working as an independent taxi cab driver. [redacted] provides often times provides fares for [redacted] Additionally, [redacted] pays [redacted] \$120 a month for insurance. [redacted] from the corner of [redacted]

[redacted] has also worked at Arco gas stations located at [redacted] and at another Arco located at Sunset and San Vicente Avenues. [redacted] has also sold carpets on the

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Investigation on 03/06/2002 at Los Angeles, CAFile # 265A-LA-280901

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]

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DR#55 (5pgs.)

265A-LA-280901

Continuation of FD-302 of

On 04/06/2002, Page 2

street or swapmeets in the past until he was given a citation for doing so and placed on probation. He would buy his carpets at United Imports [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] speaks Arabic, French, and English.

[REDACTED] has never been to Europe or the Middle East. He has also never been to Pakistan or Afghanistan. [REDACTED] claims to have never received any military or terrorist training.

[REDACTED] he is a practicing Muslim who prays five times a day, and expressed repeatedly that Islam is peaceful. He stated that he never drinks, goes to bars or clubs, and does not smoke.

[REDACTED] expressed hatred for the Taliban/Al Qaeda and said that they were not Muslims.

[REDACTED] he did not believe that Muslims were involved in the 09/11/2001 attacks on America. He said that Muslims are simple people who just pray and could not have been involved in such a complex operation.

[REDACTED] he felt extremely sad about the events of 09/11/2001. He said that he has never heard anyone express joy over the terrorist attacks, and has never heard any say that they want to harm the United States because of our current involvement in Afghanistan and the Middle East.

Currently, [REDACTED] worships at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City. He said that the Mosque director is named [REDACTED]. He said the Imam is [REDACTED].

Approximately five to seven months ago he went to Las Vegas with [REDACTED] (known to investigators as [REDACTED]) [REDACTED] is also from Tunisia. They drove to Las Vegas in [REDACTED] black Volkswagen Golf. [REDACTED] works as a valet parking attendant at a casino off the 710 freeway.

He went to Las Vegas one other time. [REDACTED] could not recall exactly when this trip occurred, but he went with [REDACTED] as well. While on this trip he met a person named [REDACTED].

Approximately four to five months ago [REDACTED] went to San Francisco with [REDACTED].

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 04/06/2002 , Page 3

[REDACTED] They rented a van and drove to San Francisco. They stayed for one night and went sight seeing the next day. They went on the trip [REDACTED] was due to return to Tunisia and had not seen San Francisco while in America.

[REDACTED] also traveled twice to San Diego. Both times he visited Sea world. The first time that he went was with [REDACTED] from Sudan. They visited no other places in San Diego while on this trip.

With regards to the second trip that [REDACTED] took to San Diego he remembered it as an after thought. He said he remembered his second trip to San Diego in the context of two Saudi Arabian nationals who flew into LAX airport and subsequently went to King Fahad Mosque. When asked to provide the sequence of events regarding the two Saudi Arabian nationals [REDACTED] provided the following:

[REDACTED] had heard that two Saudi Arabian men arrived at LAX and where met by a person unknown to [REDACTED]. This unknown person then took the two Saudis to an apartment complex that had already been rented for them. [REDACTED] stated he could not remember the address, but that it was a large white building located on Sepulveda Blvd. between Venice Blvd. and Palm St.

One or two days after the arrival of the Saudis [REDACTED] was at the King Fahad Mosque. While at the mosque [REDACTED] introduced [REDACTED] to the two Saudis and asked [REDACTED] if he could help them during their time in Los Angeles because they did not speak english. [REDACTED] agreed and gave the Saudis his taxi cab business card.

The next day the Saudis called [REDACTED] and asked him to pick them up and drive them around Los Angeles. [REDACTED] picked them up at their apartment complex and then drove them around Santa Monica, took them to the beach, and to Hollywood. That day they ate at the Cheesecake Factory and the Mediterranean Restaurant located on Venice Blvd. At the end of the day [REDACTED] took them back to their apartment complex.

Two to three days later the Saudis called [REDACTED] again. This time they wanted to go to Sea world in San Diego. They said they would pay [REDACTED] \$200 plus gas and food for the day if he took them. [REDACTED] agreed and picked them up at their apartment where he was given \$100 and told he would get the

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 04/06/2002 , Page 4

remainder after the trip. [REDACTED] stated they drove straight to San Diego and the only stop that they made was at a gas station. [REDACTED] could not remember the gas stations location in San Diego. They spent the entire day at Sea world and then returned to Los Angeles. While at Sea world the three of them never met anyone. There were occasions though where [REDACTED] used the restroom by himself and left the two Saudis alone.

One or two days after they returned to Los Angeles [REDACTED] called them to receive the remainder of his money. The [REDACTED] told him that [REDACTED] would give him the rest of the money.

When asked by investigators who else knew about the two Saudis [REDACTED] replied that no one at the Kind Fahad Mosque knew about them and that he was told by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did say that the Saudi Consulate knew about the two Saudis because it was the consulate that told [REDACTED] to take care of the Saudis.

[REDACTED] was told by [REDACTED] that the Saudis were here to see their sick father who was in a local hospital. [REDACTED] said that the Saudis stayed in Los Angeles for approximately one month and then they returned to Saudi Arabia. When asked if [REDACTED] knew for a fact that they returned to Saudi Arabia he replied no and that he was just told that they had left Los Angeles.

[REDACTED] could not remember the Saudis names, but remembered one was approximately [REDACTED] and the other was approximately [REDACTED] stated over and over that the two Saudis came to Los Angeles prior to 09/11/2001.

The following is a list of [REDACTED] friends and associates:

[REDACTED] driver in Chicago. He is [REDACTED]
Wired [REDACTED] \$2000 to bail out [REDACTED]
from INS custody in Los Angeles.

[REDACTED] LNU-Flew down from San Jose to help bail [REDACTED]
and [REDACTED] from INS custody. [REDACTED] is
[REDACTED] is Tunisian.

[REDACTED] Lives at [REDACTED] Santa Monica, CA.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/06/2002, Page 5

Works for [REDACTED] at the Metro Cab Company in West Los Angeles. Tunisian.

[REDACTED] gas station. Tunisian.

[REDACTED] restaurant at the [REDACTED] West LA.

[REDACTED] selling carpets. Drives a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] English School. 710 freeway.

[REDACTED] Went back to Tunisia. Plans to go to Canada in the future.

[REDACTED] Taxi driver. Met at King Fahad approximately one year ago. Friends with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Friends with [REDACTED] Met at King Fahad. Last saw him on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Lives on [REDACTED] in Hollywood. Works for "A" cab company [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Works as security guard in Beverly Hills.

[REDACTED] Works at a store called "Bluestone" in Hollywood.

REQ #10-1j

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FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/13/2002

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] place of birth [redacted] Santa Monica, CA, telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at the INS detention facility located at 300 N. Los Angeles St., Los Angeles, CA. Present during the interview was Los Angeles Police Officer [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia but was raised in Jordan. [redacted] at the King Fahad Mosque and worked together briefly selling carpets at swapmeets and on street corners. [redacted] currently drives a black Ford [redacted] and also owns a [redacted] van and a [redacted] BMW.

[redacted] describes [redacted] as secretive. He appears to be very concerned about not letting people know exactly what he does and how he makes his money. [redacted] apparently married an American woman which no one knew about until latter time.

[redacted] is living in [redacted] CA. [redacted] believed the address was [redacted]. The complex is off of Westwood Blvd. on Ashton Ave. one block south of Wilshire Blvd.

[redacted] is an associate of [redacted]. Two to three times a week [redacted] will run unknown errands for [redacted]. [redacted] also helped [redacted] (phonetic) when he arrived from Saudi Arabia. [redacted] believes that [redacted] is currently an Imam at a mosque in Orange County.

There is an unknown person from Yemen who attends the King Fahad Mosque who also had interaction with the two unknown Saudis the [redacted] described in his first interview. This person from Yemen is [redacted] old and has a full beard.

When the two Saudis arrived [redacted] escorted the two Saudi around Los Angeles and attempted to charge them \$450. Due to this incident the [redacted] are at

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Investigation on 03/12/2002 at Los Angeles, CAFile # 265A-LA-228901

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

On 04/06/2002, Page 2

odds. This incident is the reason that [REDACTED] to take care of the Saudis during their time in Los Angeles.

The Yemeni drives an American made off white minivan and another blue car of unknown make.

[REDACTED] is from [REDACTED] Tunisia. He is currently studying aviation at the West Los Angeles college.

[REDACTED] is currently in custody. He used to work security at a Korean market at Western Ave and Olympic Blvd. While in custody on a previous INS violation two unknown Tunisians wired \$2,000 to the United States from Tunisia to bail him out. One of the Tunisians is name [REDACTED] LNU.

[REDACTED] is currently being housed by INS in their Lancaster, CA facility. He is being housed with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] has become very quiet and withdrawn lately. [REDACTED] is very fearful that he will be deported back to Tunisia where he believes he will be placed in prison or killed. [REDACTED] is supposed to see a INS judge on March 21, 2002.

[REDACTED] is concerned about being sent back to Tunisia because of his associations with [REDACTED] Apparently, [REDACTED] just released from prison after several years for their association with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] explained that "Dawas" is when Muslims travel throughout the world and preach Islam to other Muslims who may not be practicing their religion in a manner consistent with the beliefs of those participating in the "Dawa". [REDACTED] says that those who participate in "Dawas" preach that Muslims should not drink and smoke and that they should pray five times a day and dress in customary Islamic attire.

[REDACTED] said that when he first came to the United States that he went to the Concord English School in West Los Angeles. The owner of the school is an Iranian named [REDACTED] LNU.

One of the Directors at the King Fahad Mosque is named [REDACTED] LNU. [REDACTED] used to ask for money every Friday during prayers and would collect between \$5,000 to \$10,000. He would tell people that the money was needed to pay the the mosque's electricity and water.

REQ #10-1j

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 04/06/2002 , Page 3

A group of approximately four individuals began to question where all the money was going. This group became so suspicious of [REDACTED] that they began to follow him around. [REDACTED] made some type of report to [REDACTED] in Saudi Arabia and the four individuals subsequently received letters from the King Fahad Mosque saying that they were no longer welcomed at the mosque.

On of the individuals who received this letter was named [REDACTED] LNU. [REDACTED] is the owner of a Mediterranean Restaurant on the [REDACTED]. He also started his own mosque at [REDACTED].

Another restaurant that [REDACTED] and his friends frequent is called the Mediterranean Café located at the corner of [REDACTED]. This restaurant is owned by a Lebanese Christian named [REDACTED] LNU.

During the interview [REDACTED] stated that he could show investigators the apartment complex that the two unknown Saudis (discussed in [REDACTED] first interview) stayed at during their time in Los Angeles. At this time [REDACTED] was placed in a vehicle as he directed investigators to the apartment complex.

[REDACTED] subsequently took investigators to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] The apartment complex is named [REDACTED] Terrace Apartment Homes.

[REDACTED] also remembered that when the two Saudis first arrived in Los Angeles that they stayed at the Hilton Hotel on Century Blvd near LAX before relocating to [REDACTED].

REQ #10-1j

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- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/24/2002

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] place of birth [redacted] address [redacted] Los Angeles, Ca. Telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at the Santa Monica Jail facility, Santa Monica, Ca. Present during the interview was Los Angeles Police Detectives [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing detectives and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] advised that he has been in contact with the following people during his current detention for immigration violations;

[redacted] He advised that he used to live with [redacted] [redacted] is a sudanese and has been in the U.S. for approximately 10yrs. He drives a [redacted]. He graduated from USC in 1999 or 2000. He indicated that [redacted] currently not employed. He believed [redacted] father's name was [redacted]. [redacted] indicated that he went to Las Vegas [redacted] and his family and also went to Las Vegas with just the two of them on a separate occasion. The dates of these trips were unknown to him.

[redacted]

[redacted] lived at [redacted] and was working at a restaurant until about 3-4 Months ago. He stopped working because he was caught by INS working without a permit. [redacted] indicated that when he talked to [redacted] advised him that [redacted] was worried about being deported and that the time is nearing for his deportation. When asked why they would talk about [redacted] indicated he is not friends with [redacted] he indicated that they were "just talking". He was asked what he thought of [redacted] and the fact that [redacted] were detained by the Tunisian government for being members of an anti-government group in Tunisia. He indicated that he does not know how they think so he cannot judge them. He was asked if hypothetically he knew someone with an extremist view and knew that

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Investigation on 5-23-02 at Santa Ana Jail

File # 265A-LA-228901

Date dictated

by [redacted]

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REQ 10-11 DR#55 (3pgs.)

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 5-23-02 , Page 2

someone wanted to kill others in the name of Islam how he would think of them. He indicated that he did not believe in killing others in the name of religion.

[REDACTED] to sell carpets together and lived at [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is married to an American who is muslim. [REDACTED] used to get their carpets from a store by the 710 fwy S/O the 105 Fwy called United Exports. The owner of the store is only known to him as [REDACTED]. He believes he is Palestinian or Jordanian.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] from the Hajj about one month ago. While at the Hajj [REDACTED] met up with [REDACTED] did not know how [REDACTED] got the money to go to the Hajj; only that he got it from a friend. He did not take his wife with him.

[REDACTED] was asked about his travels outside of the Los Angeles area. He indicated when he went to Las Vegas with [REDACTED] he remembered that he phoned a guy by the name of [REDACTED]. He said he met him when he used to work at Venice Beach. While they were enroute to Vegas he phoned him and met with him for lunch. He could not remember what the conversation was about and only believed they talked about regular things. He stated that [REDACTED] (the friend he phoned and then met in Vegas) works as a cab driver in Vegas for an unk cab company.

Other names he could provide included [REDACTED]. He knew him from his home town and this was the person he lived with when he first came to the U.S. He also told him how to get a student visa to stay and helped him get into the Concord English School. Another person was [REDACTED] who currently works in Culver City at the [REDACTED].

He was asked again about [REDACTED]. He indicated he was the cab driver from Chicago who wired him the money (About \$3,000) to help get [REDACTED] out of custody. He was unable to provide further on him.

He was also asked about who came down from San Jose and he indicated it was a person by the name of [REDACTED] LNU. He said [REDACTED] was

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Continuation of FD-302 of

On 5-23-02, Page 3

[REDACTED] He could not provide any further information on him.

During his last interview he was asked to identify a set of pictures. He indicated at this time that he did not recognize any of the pictures. When asked this time why he set two of these pictures to the side apart from the others, he indicated that he thought that he may recognize these two but was not 100% sure. He said they looked familiar and may have been [REDACTED]. He only knows [REDACTED] from Akram's carpet store at the [REDACTED]. He knows that he lives in Orange County, is about 31 or 32 years old and is married to a Palestinian woman.

Also brought up at his last interview was the fact that he drove two Saudi nationals to San Diego at the behest of [REDACTED]. During this interview he clarified the description of the two men and indicated that one of the two were "heavy" or "fat". He also indicated that they stayed at the apt on [REDACTED] with their sick father. The initial trip he took them on was to the Culver City/Los Angeles area and at this time their father was with them. On the trip to San Diego/Sea World it was just the two [REDACTED] that went.

REQ 10-13

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/08/2001

[redacted] also known as (aka) [redacted]
 date of birth (DOB) [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted]
 [redacted] Portland, Maine, home phone number [redacted]
 [redacted] e-mail address [redacted] was interviewed at
 the Portland, Maine Resident Agency of the FBI. After being advised of
 the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the
 interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

Additional details regarding the trip [redacted] took with [redacted]
 [redacted] (DOB: [redacted]) to Los Angeles (LA) sometime between
 December 1999 and February 2000, are provided below. (For reference,
 see FD-302s of interviews with [redacted] on 10/06/2001 and 10/07/2001).

One day [redacted] mentioned to [redacted] that his visa
 was going to expire. [redacted] needed help and asked [redacted] about the
 paperwork. [redacted] showed [redacted] some of the forms and papers. [redacted]
 [redacted] was under the impression that he had to leave the country and
 get his visa renewed. Then he would be able to return to the United
 States (U.S.). [redacted] advised [redacted] against leaving the country
 and told him he should take care of the matter through the embassy in
 the U.S. [redacted] told him to call the embassy. This conversation
 occurred at [redacted] apartment in San Diego.

Approximately one or two weeks passed and he saw [redacted]
 at the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD) mosque. [redacted] brought
 the visa subject up once again. [redacted] said he called the Saudi
 embassy and they advised they could take care of the matter. [redacted]
 [redacted] invited [redacted] to come along on the trip [redacted] needed to
 take to the consulate in LA. [redacted] told [redacted] he knew a good
 restaurant to stop at and eat in LA. [redacted] advised that
 restaurant serves good food and is Halal. He asked [redacted] if he ever
 saw the new mosque in or near Culver City. [redacted] had not been to the
 mosque. [redacted] believes the mosque is on or near Washington Street.
 [redacted] said they would visit the mosque afterwards. The trip had
 no set criteria. It centered around [redacted] going to the consulate.
 [redacted] wanted to go the following day and extended the invitation.
 [redacted] agreed to go. There was no pressure or coercion. [redacted] noted
 that in Islam one does not reject invitations unless there is a good
 reason. [redacted] asked if he should pick [redacted] up. [redacted] said he

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Investigation on 10/08/2001 at Portland, Maine

File # 265A-NY-280350-302

Date dictated

SA [redacted] b6
 by SA [redacted] b7C

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REQ 10-1b

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DR456 (7pgs.)

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

On 10/09/2001, Page 2

would come over to [REDACTED] apartment the next morning. [REDACTED] suggested to be there around 8:00 a.m. [REDACTED] indicated he would drive.

The following day [REDACTED] walked from his apartment on [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] apartment. This was on a weekday, but definitely not a Friday, as that is prayer day. He knocked on [REDACTED] door. [REDACTED] came outside and they left in [REDACTED] gold Nissan Altima. [REDACTED] needed to be at the consulate by a certain time. During the drive up to LA, they spoke mostly about religion. During the drive, [REDACTED] (hereinafter referred to as [REDACTED]) mentioned that he needed to stop and obtain some photographs of himself for the visa process. They began to look for a place to obtain the photos. They stopped at a Kinkos, but they did not do photographs. They then stopped at a large mall off the I-405 freeway on Sepulvada (phonetic). They walked in together and encountered a photo booth near the entrance. [REDACTED] got his photo taken in his traditional headwear or turban. This was apparently necessary for the visa. [REDACTED] was wearing western clothing, including a sport jacket. After obtaining the photos, they got back into the car and drove straight to the consulate in LA.

The consulate is a large white clearly marked building with underground parking. They parked underground and exited the car. [REDACTED] had his paperwork with him. They went into the reception area. They waited in the lobby. Soon a man came out and greeted [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] described the man as being in his 40s, approximately 5'8" in height, with a black/grey beard down to his chest, who was wearing a suit. It appeared that [REDACTED] and the man from the consulate knew each other. It was obvious they had met before. The conversation was in Arabic however. [REDACTED] did not understand what was exactly said. [REDACTED] introduced [REDACTED] to the man as a friend who just became a Muslim. The man switched to English and spoke to [REDACTED] briefly. [REDACTED] asked for information regarding Saudi Arabia. Shortly thereafter, [REDACTED] and the man went behind closed doors. [REDACTED] waited in the lobby for up to approximately thirty minutes. [REDACTED] and the man came out together. [REDACTED] asked the man for a packet of information on Saudi Arabia. The man told him to wait there and retrieved some items for [REDACTED]. The information included a packet of information and Islamic books. During the encounter [REDACTED] was formal, brief, and official, as if he had a business purpose. After being at the consulate for up to a maximum of one hour, [REDACTED] left. They returned to the car and [REDACTED] again drove. They spoke about how nice the interaction was. [REDACTED] indicated he was successful in getting the visa extension. [REDACTED] estimated the time was now well past noon.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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While driving they talked of their plan to go to the restaurant because they were both hungry. They drove several miles to the restaurant through surface streets looking for it. They did not have a map and were playing it by ear. [REDACTED] said the restaurant had good food and said he had taken his family there before. That is why he wanted to take [REDACTED] there. [REDACTED] found the restaurant awhile ago. They made a few U-turns, got confused trying to find it, and missed some turns. When questioned further about these driving methods, [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] was not doing those maneuvers intentionally. He found no reason to believe they were being followed or attempting to evade anything.

They finally found the restaurant and parked on the street. They walked inside the small establishment. [REDACTED] observed it be a butcher shop, with deli or bakery style refrigerator cases inside. There were no other customers. [REDACTED] inquired in Arabic to one of the employees. The three workers inside talked Arabic to [REDACTED] briefly. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] they informed him that they do not serve food any longer at the establishment. They only sell meat and operate a butcher shop. The restaurant portion of the establishment was closed down. The people inside recommended another restaurant that serves [REDACTED] that was close by. They walked to this new restaurant.

[REDACTED] described it as a Mediterranean café, which could not be any larger than 500 square feet. After entering, [REDACTED] mentioned that it was time to pray. They both ordered some food, which included humus and grape leaves. There were some other customers, such as take out customers. There were no other dine in customers at this time. Since it was time to pray, out of consideration [REDACTED] asked if [REDACTED] wanted to go to the mosque to pray. [REDACTED] said he would pray right here. [REDACTED] went to the bathroom to wash up before prayer. He was out of [REDACTED] sight for less than five minutes. [REDACTED] waited a short time, took water from the table and went outside to wash up for prayer. This was partially because he realized there was only one bathroom. Whether it was a public or employee bathroom is unclear to [REDACTED] washed near a tree outside. While he was outside washing, [REDACTED] came outside. [REDACTED] laid down a cloth to pray on. They then prayed together for approximately five minutes. They then returned inside to eat.

The only time [REDACTED] was apart from [REDACTED] was the less than five minutes he was washing in the bathroom. When asked why he did not mention that in earlier interviews, [REDACTED] responded that he did not consider that time as [REDACTED] being away, because it would have been synonymous with prayer or preparing to pray. He did not bring it up because he still considered himself to be together with [REDACTED] It was

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purely a matter of semantics and misunderstanding. When asked if [REDACTED] could have been making phone or cell phone calls during this time away, [REDACTED] doubted it. He did not notice a public phone in the establishment. [REDACTED] did have his cell phone with him but [REDACTED] did not remember him getting or making any calls at the restaurant. [REDACTED] did not think [REDACTED] would have had the time to be making calls while he was washing.

There were two workers inside the café. They both spoke English. [REDACTED] did not appear to know either of them. There was an older man cooking in the back. The female waitress indicated that he was her father.

While eating, they engaged in normal conversation. Two men came into the establishment. (The men were later determined to be NAWAF AL-HAZMI DOB: 08/09/1976 and KHALID AL-MIHDHAR DOB: 10/15/1966). [REDACTED] now realizes that the men were Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar sat down inside. They appeared to be Arabic, even though they were dressed in western clothes. [REDACTED] was wearing western clothes, but may have also had a head covering. He is not sure. How the first interaction occurred between the two men and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] is unclear. The best possibility is that they overheard the men speaking Arabic or the men overheard [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] say something Islamic. [REDACTED] is not positive who approached who first. At any rate, it seemed like a coincidental meeting. There was nothing to indicate [REDACTED] knew the two men or they knew [REDACTED] did not know either man. Introductions started and [REDACTED] was "the host" from the beginning to the end of the meeting. [REDACTED] translated and let [REDACTED] know what was occurring during the conversation between [REDACTED] and Al-Mihdhar. This was because the conversations were in Arabic and [REDACTED] did not understand it well.

[REDACTED] invited Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar to eat with them. [REDACTED] did not find this unusual as this was the type of person [REDACTED] was. [REDACTED] is very generous. They sat at a table right next to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi sat across from each other, as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were doing. [REDACTED] drew a rough diagram of the restaurant and where they were sitting. (The diagram will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file).

The conversation continued. From [REDACTED] perspective, it did not seem serious. The three of them were smiling, laughing and getting to know each other. [REDACTED] recalls Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar having "chi" or tea. They also shared some of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] food after being

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offered. [REDACTED] estimated the meeting lasted for awhile, but not any longer than one hour.

During the conversations, [REDACTED] learned that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar just came from Saudi Arabia and were students. They wanted to study English. They were currently living in LA, somewhere in the area of the restaurant, and did not like LA. Al-Hazmi was doing most of the talking with [REDACTED]. Al-Mihdhar was less talkative. At the end of the meal/meeting, [REDACTED] gave his phone number to Al-Hazmi. [REDACTED] is not sure, but believes [REDACTED] also got their phone number. [REDACTED] told Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar that they lived in San Diego and invited them to San Diego to check it out. [REDACTED] told them if they liked San Diego, he would be able to and was happy to help them. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] left the restaurant first. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar stayed behind.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] left in [REDACTED] car. They went to the Culver City mosque for sunset prayer. They spent approximately fifteen to twenty minutes there. The mosque was a few blocks from the restaurant. It could possibly be located on Washington Street. After prayer, [REDACTED] drove them back to San Diego. [REDACTED] recalls [REDACTED] calling his wife on his cell phone advising her he was on his way home. They made no additional stops. When they reached San Diego, [REDACTED] dropped [REDACTED] off on Beadnell Way and departed.

[REDACTED] was asked why he previously reported the first time he met Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar was at the party they had at their Mt. Ada Road apartment after moving to San Diego. [REDACTED] reminded the agents that he has ADD (Attention Deficit Disorder). Although he does have a good memory, he remembers some things better than others. The direct questioning by SA [REDACTED] yesterday regarding the meeting and surrounding circumstances jarred his memory. When he was at Al-Hazmi's and Al-Mihdhar's apartment on the day of the party, he spent four or five hours there. He specifically remembered this event right away because of the significant amount of time he spent with them that day. At the time of the earlier interviews (10/04/2001 and 10/06/2001), he believed that the party was the first time he met the individuals until later realizing he did have an earlier chance meeting with them. Just as [REDACTED] explained to SA [REDACTED] yesterday, he was confusing two events at the same restaurant and was unsure who he met during one of the occasions. [REDACTED] was hesitant to provide misleading or inaccurate information to the agents, or say something he was unsure of. [REDACTED] also noted the difficulty in remembering something that occurred nearly two years ago.

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The first time [REDACTED] was at the Mediterranean restaurant/café was the occasion he was with [REDACTED] as described above. The second occasion was months later during 2000, when he was in the LA area for a different issue. He was living in Santa Barbara at the time. He prayed at the nearby Culver City Mosque that day. He knew of the restaurant from his earlier visit and decided to stop and eat there. [REDACTED] was alone in LA at this time. He seems to recall meeting someone he knew from his past travels while in the restaurant on this occasion. He cannot recall who exactly he met however. This is one of the reasons he was confused earlier on the issue.

When asked if he could have been used by [REDACTED] in some way concerning this meeting, [REDACTED] said he did not think so. However, due to what happened on September 11, 2001, he now believes that there is a remote possibility. Regarding whether he was used in any manner, such as for an alibi or cover, in any of [REDACTED] activities, [REDACTED] said if he was used for this purpose he never realized it and [REDACTED] did a good job. [REDACTED] noted that he heard from his ex-wife, [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was making fun of [REDACTED] behind his back. He never knew whether to believe it.

[REDACTED] would not be talking with the FBI if he didn't think that [REDACTED] could be involved in the terrorist activity somehow. However, [REDACTED] prefaced this statement by saying that he would be very surprised to find out [REDACTED] was involved in terrorist activity. When asked what in particular may lead him to think [REDACTED] could be involved in terrorist activity, [REDACTED] said if [REDACTED] was truly on the plane that crashed, and his identity was not stolen, [REDACTED] association with [REDACTED] becomes interesting. [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] spent a lot of time together. [REDACTED] claimed to have no current contact with [REDACTED] and no knowledge of his current whereabouts. The last time they spoke was in 2000.

After [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] returned from the LA trip, he heard [REDACTED] mention Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar in passing on approximately two occasions. The conversations are difficult to remember because [REDACTED] did not consider them significant. On one occasion, [REDACTED] if he remembered the men they met in LA. [REDACTED] indicated something to the effect that they will possibly move to San Diego and came down to visit. Another time [REDACTED] mentioned that they were coming down, possibly meaning they were moving to San Diego.

There was a housewarming/welcome party for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] after they moved into their [REDACTED] apartment. This is

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the party that [REDACTED] threw for them, as explained in previous statements. [REDACTED] recalled this as his "first significant interaction" with Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar, until his memory was refreshed yesterday. This event was the strongest thing in his mind at the time. This partially caused [REDACTED] to report this as the first time he met Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. During the party, there was a large piece of plastic in the middle of the floor. Everyone sat on the floor around the edges. The attendees ate from containers placed in the middle of the plastic. [REDACTED] Al-Hazmi, and Al-Mihdhar were doing the preparation, cooking, and serving. [REDACTED] at the request of [REDACTED] filmed some of the party. At one point, [REDACTED] got in front of the camera and said a few words. This included why they were gathering and the date. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar were captured on the tape as well. Some attendees were sensitive about not being filmed.

At one point in time, [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that he was the "guarantor" for the apartment of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. [REDACTED] wanted to correct something SA [REDACTED] may have misunderstood from an earlier statement. Regarding how many occasions he was at Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar's apartment, [REDACTED] said it was between ten and twenty times. Many times he went to the apartment not to visit them, but to catch up with [REDACTED] spent a lot of time at Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar's apartment. [REDACTED] did not know Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar very well or for very long. [REDACTED] left San Diego a relatively short time after they moved into the apartment. Most of [REDACTED] interaction with Al-Hazmi was when [REDACTED] was also present. This included the occasions when [REDACTED] was at Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar's apartment.

[REDACTED] in San Diego during the time period of December 1999 to February 2000. He was homeless, but two Muslim brothers from ICSD let him sleep at their apartment. He did not spend much time with them or at the apartment. One roommate's name was [REDACTED] LNU (Last Name Unknown). He was in his mid-20s and is a computer programmer. [REDACTED] believes he still lives in that general area of San Diego. He is Yemeni, but may be of Somali descent. He also has family ties in the Netherlands. The other roommate was [REDACTED] LNU, who [REDACTED] did not know very well. [REDACTED] is approximately 20 to 25 years of age and is an engineer. He returned to Saudi Arabia in early 2000. [REDACTED] lost [REDACTED] contact information. [REDACTED] roommates were both regulars at ICSD and spoke English. They also both knew [REDACTED] very well and for much longer than [REDACTED] did. They would probably be able to provide information regarding [REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/15/2002

On 01/10/2002 and 01/11/2002, SA [] and Air Force Office of Special Investigations Special Agent [] assigned to the Los Angeles Task Force on Terrorism, conducted a canvass of various hotels located on Sepulveda Blvd. in Culver City, California. The purpose of this canvass was to determine if any of the individuals associated with the attacks of September 11, 2001 had stayed at these hotels.

Los Angeles had obtained information from FBI San Diego and FBI New York that Mr. [] resident of San Diego who was interviewed as part of a proffer agreement at the Southern District of New York, had been introduced to NAWAF AL HAZMI and KHALID AL MIHDHAR, two of the hijackers on American Airlines Flight 77, by Mr. OMAR BAYOUMI, the spiritual leader of a Kurdish mosque in Magnolia, California. [] had further stated that in late Spring/early summer 2000, he and AL HAZMI and AL MIDHAR had taken a trip from San Diego to Los Angeles in order to drop off AL MIDHAR at the Los Angeles International Airport for a Lufthansa Airlines flight to Saudi Arabia. While in Los Angeles, the three stopped off at the King Fahad mosque in Culver City, California before continuing to an unnamed motel where they spent the night prior to going to the hotel. [] had further added that he did not know the name of the hotel, but advised that the hotel was the "middle one" of three in a row. [] recalled that [] signed the register and paid for the room in cash, although [] did not recall whose identification [] used to rent the room.

Investigation by Los Angeles on 01/10/2002 and 01/11/2002 revealed the following:

On 01/10/2002, SA's [] met with [] located at [] Culver City, CA. 90230, [] Deano's motel is the "middle" motel between two other motels immediately adjacent to its left and right. [] voluntarily provided the agents with the motel's guest registration cards from January 2000 to the present. While searching the registration cards, SA's [] discovered a registration card under the name of [] dated [] The registration card had the

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SA [] b7C

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following information listed on it: _____
_____. CA. Car license Number: _____ State: CA
Make of Car: _____ Style: _____ Number of Persons: _____ The
registration card further revealed that _____ checked into the
motel, _____ and checked out on 06/10/2000 and
paid the total amount of \$51.52. The registration card was seized
by SA _____ and secured at the FBI Los Angeles evidence facility.

On 01/10/2002, SA's _____ met with Ms.
_____, manager of the Halfmoon Motel, located at _____
_____, Culver City, CA. 90230, _____
voluntarily provided the agents with the motel's guest registration
cards from January 2000 to the present. While searching the
registration cards, SA's _____ discovered a
registration card under the name of _____ dated 01/09/2000. Above
the name, written in pencil by the motel registration clerk was the
name _____. The registration card also contained the
following information: address: _____ CA, 92111;
Identification: _____ Room number: _____ No. in party: 3; amount
paid: \$47.04; method of payment: Visa credit card reference number:
08801001. The registration card was also signed by _____. The
registration card was seized by SA _____ and secured at the FBI
Los Angeles evidence facility.

On 01/11/2002, SA's _____ met with _____
_____, Travellodge Motel, located at _____
_____, Culver City, CA. 90232, _____ voluntarily
provided the agents with the motel's guest registration forms and
computerized registration database from December 1999 to the
present. While searching the registration forms and database, SA's
_____ discovered a registration form under the name
of _____ dated _____. The information on the form
revealed the following: address: _____ San Diego,
CA. 92117; Number of Guests: 1. The registration form also revealed
that _____ checked into the hotel on 01/09/2000 at 21:28 hours
and checked out at 21:50 hours. _____ was not charged for his
stay. Additionally, SA's _____ discovered
registration forms from 12/20/1999 for _____
_____, San Diego, CA.
_____. The registration form
indicated that the _____ checked into the hotel on
12/20/1999 and checked out on 12/21/1999.

Additionally, SA's _____ discovered a
registration form for _____ who had stayed at the

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hotel from 05/08/2001 to 05/15/2001. [redacted] had provided the following information: address: [redacted] Saudi Arabia; credit card number [redacted] vehicle: [redacted] Corolla, California license plate: [redacted] Investigation of the attacks of September 11, 2001 has revealed that [redacted] and [redacted] were two of the hijackers on United Airlines Flight 175, and that [redacted] was one of the hijackers onboard United Airlines Flight 93. The registration forms were seized by SA [redacted] and secured at the FBI Los Angeles evidence facility.

Furthermore, [redacted] informed the agents that many individuals that visit the King Fahad mosque stay at their motel due to its close proximity to the mosque.